

**HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME  
ENVIRONMENT: MARITIME DOMAIN  
AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING**

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**FIELD HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME,  
AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM**

OF THE

**COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS**

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## HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND VESSEL TRACKING

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**Monday, November 26, 2007**

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME,  
AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., at Miami City Hall, 3500 Pan American Drive, Miami, Florida, Hon. Loretta Sanchez [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Sanchez and Bilirakis.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Good afternoon. I am pleased that this Subcommittee is able to hold this Field Hearing in Miami, and I would like to start by thanking Congressman Bilirakis for his interest in this hearing, and to thank our witnesses today for agreeing to testify, especially at the end of a Thanksgiving holiday. Thank you for being here.

And I would also like to thank the City of Miami for allowing us to use this space today to hold the hearing.

Maritime security is an incredibly important priority for this Subcommittee. In fact, it is carried in our name. Our nation's maritime ports play a critical role in America's economy, and in our day-to-day lives for many of us.

But, as we have gone to take a look at different ports this past year in particular, we have come across the realization that there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to our port security. Every port that I have visited has been incredibly interesting, and yet very diverse than the last one I had been to.

Of course, the ports that I am most familiar with are the Long Beach/Los Angeles ports, the largest system that we have here in our nation. But, again, they have different challenges, and opportunities, than the rest of the ports that we have here in the United States. So it was a really great visit this morning at the Port of Miami, take a look at the particulars for that port.

And I want to thank everyone at the Port of Miami, Miami-Dade County, the Coast Guard, our customs and border protection, and all the related parties that helped us this morning with respect to taking a look at the particulars of the Port of Miami.

One of the distinctive characteristics of the Port of Miami is the high volume of cruise ship vessel traffic, which has earned the port this distinction of The Cruise Capital of the World.

In addition to cruise ships, the Port of Miami is also the largest container port here in Florida. And, given the diverse vessel traffic

at the Port of Miami, and the significant pleasure boat presence in the region, this is a perfect place to frame a discussion about Maritime Domain Awareness, or what we call MDA, and Vessel Tracking.

MDA is an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain that could impact the security, the safety, the economy, or the environment of the United States. And achieving and maintaining full Maritime Domain Awareness at any port is a challenge, in particular here in Miami. And that is one of the reasons why, for a long time now, I have been wanting to come here and take a look at this port in particular. Especially because of the small pleasure craft that are here, and what it means to our country.

Remember that this Subcommittee not only does maritime, it does all egress and ingress into this nation. And from that standpoint, the type of people who come through here, through Miami, through the coastal waters of Florida in particular are of a great concern for us. We need to understand how best it is that we protect our coastal—our shores from people and contraband coming in.

And I say that because, while our focus, in a large respect, from this Subcommittee and, of course, the Congress and even America right now, is about people crossing our land borders. The fact of the matter is, we have a lot more maritime coastal borders than land borders to this United States. And we have not really focused on that aspect.

And as we tighten up those land borders, people will find different ways, or find the weaker link, to get in to the United States. And this will be a big challenge, especially for this area, Florida, and for Miami in particular.

I am interested in the collaboration between the Coast Guard and The Mariner Group to enhance situational awareness in the emergency response at Miami Sector Command Center.

And another issue that I think is very important for maritime security and Maritime Domain Awareness is the vessel tracking systems. And I am concerned about whether the Coast Guard and the ports have sufficient and accessible vessel tracking capabilities. So I look forward to you, to our witnesses discussing some of these and some of the other issues related to the Maritime Domain Awareness.

And now, the Chair would like to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis—

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. SANCHEZ. —for an opening statement.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I appreciate it very much. I appreciate you holding this hearing here today, particularly having to travel all the way across the country to be here. You truly are a great Chairperson, and I really am honored to serve under you.

I would also like to welcome you to the State of Florida. I look forward to discussing the Maritime Domain Awareness and Vessel Tracking by the United States Coast Guard.

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

The Florida district I represent includes the portions of Clearwater, Tarpon Springs, Palm Harbor, and the Gulf Coast of Pasco

County, including New Port Richey, and also Hillsborough County, where the Port of Tampa is located.

The people in my district understand firsthand the important of maritime security. And I am very interested in the progress being made by the Coast Guard, specifically in tracking small boats, sharing intelligence, and establishing a common operating picture.

To improve Maritime Domain Awareness, the Coast Guard must be able to effectively locate, identify, and track maritime targets of interest in U.S. waters and beyond.

The Safe Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, requires him to develop and implement a long-range automated vessel tracking system. To coordinate the Coast Guard's vessel tracking program, the law authorized funding for the creation of an Inter-agency Command Centers at all major U.S. ports. The Vessel Tracking System would feed these command centers using a common operating picture to insure that inter-agency assets receive proper notice and have adequate time to respond to inbound waterborne threats.

During today's hearing, I want to get a better understanding of the Coast Guard's operational capabilities to track approaching vessels. I would also like to examine what the Coast Guard is doing to address the increasing small boat threat.

It is critical that the Coast Guard be able to identify, track, and analyze daily unreported threats, such as small vessels smuggling terrorists, weapons, illegal narcotics, and illegal aliens.

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today, especially Colonel Bill Janes, who can offer unique insight into the impact of narcotics smuggling into the State of Florida, and help us identify ways to improve drug interdiction capabilities and information sharing.

I am especially interested in his testimony, and would like to express my appreciation for Bill's participation here today.

Colonel JANES. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Integration and coordination across federal, state, and local operations strategies and tactics is critical to the Coast Guard's strategic mission.

And I want to thank Madam Chair again for having this hearing. I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the gentleman from Florida, and I would just like to put on the record that when I spoke to the gentleman about doing a port visit down here to Miami, he said that would be great, but Tampa would be better. So I just want to put that in the record, because I know that he has asked, and maybe—maybe when we get to—we will get to it, but I know that you are looking out for your constituents.

Okay. So, normally, our witnesses would be in front of us, but we will have to sort of lean over and look at you. If I send in a bill for my neck, I will let you know. But it is great to have you up here on the dais with us.

And let me welcome you and give a little background on each of you, and then we will listen to your testimony.

Our first witness is Captain Karl Schultz. He is the Commander of Coast Guard Sector of Miami. And the Captain reports to Sector

Miami from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he completed a one-year research fellowship in National Security Studies. And from July, 2003 to July of 2005, Captain Schultz served as Commanding Officer aboard the United States Coast Guard Cutter Venturous, leading diverse counter-drug, alien migrant interdiction, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations in the maritime approaches to the southeastern United States and throughout the Caribbean Basin.

Captain Schultz has served in numerous other afloat and ashore assignments since graduating from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1983.

Our second witness is Mr. Stephen D. Dryden, President and CEO of The Mariner Group, a software company focused on Homeland Security with particular emphasis in Maritime Domain Awareness.

His current MDA efforts include working with the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard's Research and Development Center on the United States Coast Guard Sector Command Centers of the future visualization and response applications for Enhanced Watch-Stander Situational Awareness Project. That is a long name there.

And our third and final witness is Colonel, U.S. Army Retired, William Janes, Director, Florida Officer of Drug Control. And he served in the U.S. Army for 24 years, commanded at the Company, Battalion, and the Brigade levels.

We welcome all of you.

Oh, and after leaving the military, he was a counselor, a manager, and Executive Director for the Drug Abuse Comprehensive Coordinated Office in Tampa for ten years. And from 2002 to 2006, he served as the Director, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute at St. Petersburg College.

Welcome to all three of the gentlemen.

And without objection, the witnesses' full statements, which they turned in, will be inserted in the record. And I will now ask each of the witnesses to summarize his statement for five minutes, beginning with Captain Schultz.

And let us know what you think we need to know about, and maybe if you can address some of the issues in our opening statements. For five minutes.

#### **STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL SCHULTZ, COMMANDER, U.S. COAST GUARD SECTOR MIAMI**

Captain SCHULTZ. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, Congressman Bilirakis. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South Florida, and to address your specific questions pertaining to vessel tracking and domain awareness.

As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the region's Federal maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.



To provide some context on the scope of Sector Miami's maritime security workload, I note that the Sector is responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline. Within this region, there are five seaports, collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The region is home to two of three of the largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4 million passengers passing through each, Port Everglades and Port of Miami, which you toured earlier today.

Additionally, more than 2 million shipping containers and 20 percent of Florida's gasoline and petroleum products servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these same ports.

Within our area of responsibility, the Coast Guard regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act facilities.

Our maritime security mission requirements are quite complex, as we focus on securing our port and coastal waterways against potential terrorist activities, as well as persistent threats from illegal migrants, drugs and other commodities trafficked via maritime means.

Miami is known as the Gateway to the Americas, and the proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to international points of origin or trans-ship for illegal migrant and illicit narcotics smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. The maritime border is complex, and requires an integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism, and immigration. We are committed to striking an optimal balance between trade, travel, and security in all that we do.

The Committee's invitation noted, as you mentioned, Madam Chairwoman, the specific interest in Maritime Domain Awareness and Vessel Tracking. And I think, because of its importance, I will restate exactly what Maritime Domain Awareness is. It is, in fact, as you stated, the effective understanding of anything associated with global maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the economy, or the environment, and it is essential to Sector Miami and our ability to accomplish our broad portfolio of missions.

MDA supports all Coast Guard missions, and, more specifically, our tactical, operational, and strategic decision-making. MDA integrated global maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness, and requires collaboration across all layers of government, and with the private sector, and with international stakeholders.

Miami, interestingly enough, is home of the Coast Guard's first Sector Command, which was established back in 2004. And our Sector Command Center serves as a site for two significant Maritime Domain Awareness-related pilot projects. These are conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate.

The first, Project Hawkeye, is a limited sensor network that integrates radar, cameras, and automatic identification system, or AIS, data feeds to provide automated vessel tracking data, and port activity monitoring capability to our Command Center watch-standers.

The second, the Visualization and Response Tools Project, which you also mentioned, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us understand how to visualize a tactical situation and the security

posture of the seaport by correlating sensor and automated vessel tracking information with advanced notification of arrival information and other port activities and data sources.

These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's proposed acquisition project called Command 21, and give the Sector important perspective and visibility on the wide array of threats to the maritime domain here in South Florida.

There is still a long way to go in managing all the information required to support our daily operations and our daily decision-making. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels through programs like the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process, and the forthcoming International Maritime Organizations Long Range Identification and Tracking Initiative, which you mentioned, Congressman Bilirakis, is just the start.

The small boat threat, for example, continues to present technological and policy challenges, and remains a primary maritime security concern, particularly in our area, where we have over 100,000 registered recreational vessels just in Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade Counties alone.

Collaboration across all layers of government, federal, state, and local, as well as with the private sector and international stakeholders is essential to achieve meaningful MDA and, in turn, address the myriad of threats in our domain. We work hard in south-east Florida to ensure interagency collaboration, and insure that collaboration informs and improves our layered approach to maritime security.

Coordinating bodies such as our Area Maritime Security Committee and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida's Regional Domestic Security Task Force, which here locally brings 100-plus first responder agencies together in a coordinating framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination.

Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as state and local agencies, private maritime organizations such as CLIA, local shippers, the ports, terminal operators, industry groups, these are all critical to the success of our cooperation and that integration in the region.

The Sector Miami team works diligently to insure our maritime borders and seaports are as secure as possible given our available capabilities and resources. We place continuous emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new technologies, and on delivering operational excellence in all that we do.

We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale, and are grateful for your interest in our operations.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I have submitted my written statement for the record, and I look forward to your questions.

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN KARL L. SCHULTZ

Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of Coast Guard Sector Miami in securing our maritime borders in South Florida, and to address your specific in-

terests in maritime domain awareness and vessel tracking. I am grateful for your interest in our unique operating environment and pleased to welcome you here.

As Sector Commander and Captain of the Port of Miami, I have several statutory responsibilities. I serve as the region's Federal Maritime Security Coordinator; the Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Coordinator; the Officer-in-Charge Marine Inspection; and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The Sector focuses on two major operational processes—PREVENTION and RESPONSE—in support of our service's five fundamental roles: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Maritime Mobility, the Protection of Natural Resources, and National Defense.

The seaports in Sector Miami's Captain of the Port zone are located on shared-use waterways in densely populated areas. To provide some context on the scope of Sector Miami's maritime security workload, I note that the Sector is responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles of southeast Florida coastline and encompassing numerous counties. Within this region there are five ports, collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. The region is home to two of the three largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4 million passengers moving through both Port Everglades and the Port of Miami annually. Additionally, more than 2 million shipping containers (TEUs) and 20% of Florida's gasoline and petroleum products servicing 12 neighboring counties pass through these ports. The region is also home to 2 nuclear power plants, and the local commercial fleet includes 370 small passenger vessels. There are also 170,000 registered recreational boats in Palm Beach, Miami Dade and Broward counties alone. Within our Area of Responsibility, the Coast Guard regulates more than 260 Maritime Transportation Security Act facilities.

Our maritime security mission requirements, while only a subset of our broader Coast Guard responsibilities, are quite complex as we focus on securing our port and coastal waterways against potential terrorist activities as well as potentially persistent threats from illegal migrants, drugs and other commodities and implements trafficked via maritime means. Miami is known as the "Gateway to the Americas," and the proximity of Sector Miami's Area of Responsibility to international origination or trans-shipment points for illegal migrant and illicit narcotic smuggling, presents significant operational challenges. To be certain, the maritime border is a complex national border requiring an integrated approach to security, commerce, tourism and immigration. We are committed to striking an optimal balance among trade, travel and security in all that we do.

The Committee's invitation noted a specific interest in the areas of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking. These issues are relevant to Sector Miami and I am pleased to speak to them. MDA, or the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect safety, security, the economy or the environment, is essential to the Sector's ability to accomplish its broad portfolio of missions, including seaport and border security, maritime safety, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and the facilitation of maritime commerce. Indeed, MDA supports all Coast Guard mission areas, and more specifically, our tactical, operational and strategic decision-making. MDA integrates global maritime intelligence with global maritime situational awareness and requires collaboration across all layers of government (federal/state/local), the private sector, and with international stakeholders.

Miami is home to the Coast Guard's first Sector Command, established in 2004. The Sector Command Center (SCC) coordinates Coast Guard resources applied to the full spectrum of Coast Guard missions found in Southeast Florida and serves as the hub, or central nervous system, of the command. Sector Miami's SCC is also the site for two significant MDA-related pilot projects conducted jointly with the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. The first, "Project Hawkeye," is a limited sensor network that integrates radar, cameras and Automatic Identification System data (AIS) to provide automated vessel tracking data and port activity monitoring capability to the SCC. The second, the Visualization and Response Tools project, is a proof-of-concept effort designed to help us understand how to visualize the tactical situation and security posture of the seaport by correlating sensor and automated vessel tracking information with advanced notification of arrival information and other port activity. These projects serve as test beds for the Coast Guard's proposed acquisition project called "Command 21," and give the Sector important perspective and visibility on a wide array of threats to the maritime domain. The Command 21 project is conceptually designed to provide port-level MDA and to highlight information gaps to provide Sector Commanders with the ability to synthesize MDA information in the SCC and to further share that information with federal, state and local partners.

There is still a long way to go in managing all the information required to support daily operations and decision-making. Tracking large, ocean-going vessels through

programs like the National Automatic Identification System, Advanced Notice of Arrival process and the forthcoming International Maritime Organization's Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) is just the start. The small boat threat, for example, continues to present technology and policy challenges and remains a primary maritime security concern, particularly in the Sector Miami area of operations where, as I mentioned earlier, we have over 170,000 registered recreational boats. Within the Department of Homeland Security, we are working closely with CBP to expand our efforts to secure the small maritime craft environment.

Collaboration across all layers of government (federal, state and local), as well as with the private sector and international stakeholders is essential to achieving meaningful MDA and in turn addressing the myriad of threats in the maritime domain. We work hard in Southeast Florida to ensure interagency collaboration informs and improves our layered approach to maritime security. Coordinating bodies such as our Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) and its active subcommittees, as well as the State of Florida's Southeast Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF-SE), which brings more than 100 first responder agencies together in a coordinating framework, are pivotal to our collaboration and operational coordination. Key partnerships with federal agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their Joint Terrorism Task Force; as well as state and local agencies and private maritime organizations including the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), local shippers, terminal operators and other industry groups are critical to the success of our cooperation and integration in the region.

In my estimation, Sector Miami's focus on a risk-based approach to layered maritime security is serving Southeast Florida well. The Sector Miami team of active duty, reserve, civilian employees and Coast Guard Auxiliarists (our volunteers) works diligently to ensure our maritime border and seaports are as secure as possible given available capabilities and resources. At Sector Miami, we place continuous emphasis on cultivating and nurturing partnerships, on applying new technologies and on delivering operational excellence in all that we do. We are proud to serve the nation in this critical locale and again grateful for your interest in our operations.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.

And I now recognize Mr. Dryden to summarize his statement for five minutes.

#### **STATEMENT OF STEPHEN DRYDEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE MARINER GROUP**

Mr. DRYDEN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman, Congressman Bilirakis. I am Steve Dryden, CEO of The Mariner Group. It is an honor to appear here today and talk about the MDA and Vessel Tracking.

My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the Coast Guard over the last three years to significantly improve MDA and situational response. My goal is to basically review the overall project mission, take you through the challenges we have encountered, and then, at the end of this, is to also urge full support of the Safe Port Act and the funding that has already been put in for the President to sign.

As you know, the Safe Port Act directs the Coast Guard to establish Interagency Operations Centers for enhancing port security at locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with the Coast Guard through the Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response, which is a mouthful, I agree.

As part of the project, Mariner software application, Command Bridge, has been employed as the primary underlying technology to increase domain awareness in Sector Command Center Miami.

I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I believe is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to insure safety and security.

Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important than gaining actionable situation awareness. In a Coast Guard Command Center, or any complex border infrastructure or transportation environment, watch-standers must maintain an understanding of what is going on at all times, while simultaneously working to predict and prevent ever-changing threats.

The work of this Committee and the government as a whole has allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime and other security areas. And more and more data is being generated to help users make decisions. But an unintended consequence of this is massive amounts of data, and the user becomes overloaded with too much information. So it is harder to focus on particular, important information.

Simply put, it is harder to find the needle in the haystack when the haystack keeps getting bigger and bigger.

The goal of the Viz Tools Projects is to inform decision-makers and then enable them to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program places strong emphasis on providing operational end-users with the technology, the capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attack, counteract illegal activities, and to help manage those response-related actions.

The project was funded by DHS S&T in collaboration with the Coast Guard R&D Center. It is currently an operational prototype in Sector Miami, here.

Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data, better analyze that data to create knowledge, and then create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the knowledge, then disseminate that information internally to the Coast Guard and well as externally to port partners.

Overall, the project objectives include develop and maintain an accurate situational picture, identify threats rapidly without the need for extensive manpower, and then plan and manage those stages of response.

Prior to Viz Tools, watch-standers had to manually achieve situational awareness by monitoring information from a lot of sources, such as radar, the harbor pilots, internal Coast Guard systems, weather, and there was just a litany of systems that had to be identified and looked at all the time.

Getting true situational awareness requires advanced technology that can focus on meaningful, relevant information. Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefit, but also can contribute to an overload, negatively affecting the situation.

The Viz Tools Project not only fuses information from many sources, it also analyzes the combined information for anomalies, and then presents meaningful, actionable knowledge without the clutter.

These capabilities keep the watch-stander focused on what is important, while delivering the right information to the right person at the right time.

We are making great stride, but critical gaps still need to be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of developing regional security should be properly incorporated into these Interagency Command Centers.

Number one, the integration of cargo and vessel information. Two, better sensor technology installed to track small boats and non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off AIS transponders.

The current state of technology in ports today is really—really falls short in their ability to do this.

Emerging projects such as DHS has with the Coast Guard, one is called the Automated Scene Understanding Project, which is showing a lot of potential benefit, and needs to be examined more.

We need to foster a better sense of coordination with local law enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security in instant response.

We need to be able to conduct longer range vessel tracking of transits that are out there, not necessarily headed to and from the port, but are actually out there in the vicinity.

And lastly, we need to integrate information in response-related activities related to high-interest, critical facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard, but they may be on, adjacent to, over or under U.S. navigable waters.

In conclusion, I would recommend that you and your Committee provide full funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The President budget recommends only minimal funding for the Command 21 Program. Fortunately, with your leadership, Madam Chairman and Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include \$40,000,000 for the Command 21 Program, and the Senate has proposed 60,000,000 in 2008 funding.

It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall behind another year in this program. In my view, facilitating regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most important and the most difficult challenge we face in the larger area of port security.

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you today, and giving me the opportunity to talk before you.

[The information follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. DRYDEN

Good afternoon Madame Chairwoman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am Steve Dryden, Chief Executive Officer of The Mariner Group. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Vessel Tracking.

My company, The Mariner Group, has been working with the US Coast Guard over the past three years to significantly improve MDA and response throughout the nation. My goals today are to inform you of the overall project mission, the challenges encountered in gaining true MDA, and lastly, to urge support for full funding of the Safe Port Act of 2006.

As you know, the Safe Port Act of 2006 directs the Coast Guard to establish interagency operations centers for enhancing port security at locations around the nation. The Mariner Group is working with the Coast Guard through their Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response, or "Viz Tools", for Sector Command Centers to help in this effort. As part of this project, Mariner's software application, CommandBridge, has been employed as the primary underlying technology to increase Maritime Domain Awareness at the Sector Command Center—Miami. I would like to take a few minutes to share with you what I believe

is an important aspect of the Coast Guard's efforts to ensure the safety and security of U.S. waters.

Of the many challenges in achieving MDA, none are more important than gaining Actionable Situation Awareness. "Situation awareness is the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future."<sup>1</sup> In a Coast Guard command center, or any highly complex border, infrastructure, or transportation environment, watch standers must maintain an understanding of what is going on at all times while simultaneously working to predict and prevent ever changing threats.<sup>2</sup>

The work of this committee, and the government as a whole, has allowed technology to be applied to many critical issues in maritime or other homeland security areas, and more and more data is being generated to help users make decisions. As examples, technologies including RADAR, cameras, Automatic Identification Systems, and perimeter detection systems have been implemented throughout our ports. But an unintended consequence of massive amounts of data is that users are overloaded with that data, making it harder to focus on the most important information. Simply put, it's harder to find the needle-in-the-haystack when the haystack keeps getting larger.

The goal of the Viz Tools project is to inform decision makers and enable them to take action to prevent incidents and/or appropriately coordinate incident response. The program places strong emphasis on providing operational end-users with the technology and capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, counter-act illegal activities, and to help manage response related actions.

The project was funded by the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) in collaboration with the Coast Guard R&D Center and Pacific Northwest National Labs (PNNL). The system is currently operational as a prototype in District Seven at the Coast Guard's Sector Command Center in Miami. Viz Tools uses advanced methods to collect and fuse data, better analyze the data to create knowledge, create more effective ways to visualize and act upon the knowledge, and disseminates information internally to the Coast Guard and their appropriate partners.

Viz Tools' overall project objectives are to:

- Develop and maintain an accurate situational picture;
- Assimilate relevant sensor data and couple it with amplifying information;
- Identify threats rapidly without the need for extensive manpower;
- Comprehend the nature and gravity of the emerging threat;
- Maximize Blue Force Assets, operational capacity, and readiness to offset the threat; and
- Plan and manage the stages of emergency response.

Prior to Viz Tools, watch standers had to manually achieve situation awareness by monitoring information from numerous sources such as RADAR screens, harbor pilot websites, messaging, commercial information sources, weather systems, internal Coast Guard systems, etc.

Gaining true actionable situation awareness requires advanced technology that can focus the user on meaningful, relevant information. Just displaying large amounts of data not only lacks benefits but can also contribute to sensory overload negatively affecting the situation. Viz Tools not only fuses information from many diverse sources, it also analyzes the combined information for anomalies and then presents meaningful, actionable knowledge without the ancillary clutter. These capabilities keep the watch stander focused on what's important while delivering the right information to the right person at the right time.

Viz Tools enables the Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, and Port Partners the ability to understand their current situation by providing them the most relevant, actionable information and implementing the most appropriate security protocols. Currently envisioned, Viz Tools will promote the ability to leverage current technology programs and allow easy adaption of additional technologies as port security needs evolve.

Let me give you an illustration: If a container ship is heading for the Port of Miami, Viz Tools tracks its progress. Before it has entered the area, Viz Tools analyzes all relevant information, assessing anomalies, safety, and terrorist potential. Information from the Coast Guard, port authorities, harbor pilots, Lloyd's Register, and other vital sources pour in, creating a federated view. In addition, we will be

<sup>1</sup>Designing for Situation Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered Design by Mica R. Endsley, Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones.

<sup>2</sup>See Attachment "The Mariner Group".

working to incorporate information on cargo sensitivity with relevant information collected about the vessel.

Correlating and verifying all information, Viz Tools can apply anomaly detection to monitor information such as changes in ownership, manifest discrepancies, inconsistent arrival information, and other intelligence as it becomes available. These anomalies automatically display on the user's screen as an alert that necessitates immediate action. In addition, Viz Tools currently allows the Coast Guard to maintain operational control such as alerting the watch stander that a vessel operating under restriction has begun to move. Based upon the situation, the watch stander can use Viz Tools to automatically contact the appropriate resource to instigate an intervention, detaining the ship until it achieves an all-clear status. Over time, Viz Tools will evolve to incorporate changing security scenarios by assembling a growing portfolio of alert circumstances and therefore continuously increasing port security. While we are making great strides, critical gaps still need to be addressed. I would submit that certain areas of developing regional maritime security should properly be incorporated into the interagency command centers, including:

1. The integration of cargo and vessel information into Viz Tools.
2. Better sensor technology installed to track small boats and non-cooperative vessels that may attempt to spoof or turn off required AIS transponders. The current state of technology in today's ports falls short in their ability to track non-cooperative vessels and small boats. For example, a vessel may be deemed non-cooperative if its Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking isn't turned on. Small boats that don't have AIS tracking technology are also a potential threat. Emerging projects such as DHS S&T / USCG R&D Center's Automated Scene Understanding project offers the potential to mitigate this shortfall.
3. Foster a better sense of coordination with local law enforcement and emergency responders to coordinate security and incident response.
4. Ability to conduct longer range vessel tracking of transits.
5. Integrate information and response related activities related to high-interest, critical facilities that are not regulated by the Coast Guard that are on, adjacent to, over, or under, U.S. navigable waters.

In conclusion, I would also recommend that you and your committee provide full funding for the Safe Port Act requirements. The President's Budget recommends only minimal funding for the Command/21 program. Fortunately, with your leadership Madame Chairman and Congressman Bilirakis, the House has chosen to include \$40 million dollars for the Command/21 program, and the Senate has proposed \$60 million in 2008 funding. It will be critical to ensure that we do not fall behind another year on this program. In my view, facilitating regional maritime security coordination and response may be the most important and most difficult challenge that we face in the larger area of port security.


Thank you very much for the invitation to speak before you today and for giving me the opportunity to talk to you about Maritime Domain Awareness and Vessel Tracking I'm proud to be associated with this project and am happy to answer any questions you may have.





## THE MARINER GROUP

### ACTIONABLE SITUATION AWARENESS

- Port Related Security Entities Must Constantly Identify and Assess Threats
- People working in critical environments depend highly on Situation Awareness
- Situation Awareness brings insight and order to gain knowledge, optimize disparate information, facilitate information sharing in real time, and develop proactive problem solutions.
- True Actionable Situation Awareness requires advanced technology that can focus the user on meaningful, relevant information.





Organized, Consistent Information

MARINER



## Advanced Anomaly Detection

MARINER



## Focused, Actionable Situation

MARINER

## THE MARINER GROUP

### ACTIONABLE SITUATION AWARENESS

- CommandBridge can help users finally achieve Actionable Situation Awareness while reducing data clutter
- CommandBridge provides information in-context and gives users the ability to discover anomalies across all data
- CommandBridge saves lives and dollars.
- CommandBridge *is* Actionable Situation Awareness.

MARINER

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Dryden. And I thank you for your testimony.

And I now recognize Colonel, is it Janes or Jannis?

Colonel JANES. Janes.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Janes. Okay. Colonel Janes, to summarize your statement for five minutes or less, please.

#### **STATEMENT OF COLONEL WILLIAM G. JANES, (U.S. ARMY, RET.), DIRECTOR, FLORIDA OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL STATEMENT OF KARL SCHULTZ**

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership; Congressman Bilirakis, for your outstanding leadership in Florida and terrific support of my office; fellow panelists. I am delighted to testify.

On behalf of Governor Charlie Crist and the state, port, and community leaders involved in the combined efforts to secure our ports, Florida, and our nation from a transportation security incident, drug trafficking, I thank Congress, and particularly this Subcommittee, for the opportunity to talk about our ports, particularly Florida ports, the global supply chain, and how to protect the citizens of Florida.

In terms of geography demography, Florida has many features which make it exceptionally attractive for drug trafficking organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely diverse population with strong representation from the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico. Florida has approximately 1350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline, and the Florida Keys archipelago, that lies astride some of the major drug trafficking routes into the United States.

During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the daunting task of seaport security. We began initially focused on crime, cargo theft, drug trafficking, but expanded to terrorism after the horrific events of 9/11.

Our emergency responders in ports are superbly trained and prepared for an incident, but, most importantly, to prevent it. We have implemented Regional Domestic Security Task Forces across our state to respond to an all-hazards threat.

Most states have two to three ports to secure. Florida has 14 deep, public deepwater seaports. Our coastlines are dotted with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas and ports engaged in intra—as well as interstate and international business. These present horrific challenges to secure from drug trafficking.

Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports, even as we better secure them from a transportation security incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is a primary concern for our governor, congressional delegation, legislators, and citizens.

The challenge of securing Florida ports, Madam Chair, you noted with the differences in port governance, organizational structure, geography, law enforcement support, labor issues, fundamental funding mechanisms, and commercial operations.

Drug trafficking is now recognized as a nexus for terrorism. Drug trafficking is facilitated when cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities. Vessels remain for lengthy stays; access control is superficial; physical security is limited; security planning is incomplete; law enforcement presence is inadequate; and information security is poor.

Our security standards address these as best we can at this point.

Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal maritime activity. Certainly, heroin moves in large quantities through Florida. Columbians continue to dominate drug and money laundering operations. However, Jamaican, Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact drug trafficking in Florida.

In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels, with 27,204 commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. Monitoring these would not be unlike trying to secure a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in one of our major cities. These vast numbers of watercraft, combined with superb navigational technology, greatly assist small vessel drug smugglers moving into Florida.

Specifically, you asked me to address vulnerabilities. I believe the drug trafficking vulnerabilities include a regional threat versus a state response. Drug trafficking is international, yet our response is often local, to a sheriff, local law enforcement. We need a regional response that includes adjacent states, waterways, air, land, and sea approaches. There are inadequate resources at the federal, state, and local level to address the volume of drug trafficking that occurs in our state and across our nation.

As you indicated, the shift of emphasis to the southwest border will push resources to this corridor again. Arguably, that happened as we moved them away from this corridor ten to fifteen years ago, but a lot of those resources have been diverted to the war in Iraq.

Internal conspiracies present a threat, where a vessel crew, passenger, stevedores, checkers, anyone, can be involved in the lucrative business of drug trafficking.

There is a tension between commerce and security. Security costs these ports great amounts of dollars, yet it is very important. Security can slow commerce. These tensions have to be addressed.

Poor information sharing. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence sharing was well documented. Law enforcement sharing of information today is impeded with privacy concerns. Though very important, have to be addressed as law enforcement background information and other intelligence is shared.

There is imprecise tracking of cargo, which presents problems. Federal and state planning must be enhanced into local planning, regional planning that is unified.

The law enforcement response must be preventive, proactive. Historically, our law enforcement have responded to criminal activity, investigated, traced the source all the way back, in some cases, to a drug trafficking organization. We must become proactive.

There is a nexus between drug traffic and transportation security incidents, but I don't believe it is operationalized today.

We should be sharing lessons learned, best practices. Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource. The current Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, has not been aligned with the Florida Credential adequately; we are not sharing information.

How to close these vulnerabilities. Fix responsibility for regional, state planning, that includes air, land, sea, and geographic areas I mentioned. Develop regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug strategies. Produce a regional drug threat analysis. State-wide drug threat analyses do not exist today. We believe we will have the first truly state-wide drug assessment next year.

We must share information from law enforcement; involve our port directors and port security staff in intelligence information sharing on a daily basis; include them in operations; prioritize Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which has been an interdiction resource in past years, that reduction in resources has affected that.

Finally, include a national plan with regional emphasis and, for me, of course, a state-wide focus.

Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security among our great partners throughout the country. We have implemented one of our nation's first drug control strategies.

Your hearing today enables us to unify these systems. I am honored to have the opportunity to present this testimony, which is expanded in my written comments.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The information follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. JANES

Good afternoon, it is my distinct honor to testify before the esteemed members of the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism. On behalf of Florida Governor Charlie Crist and state and community leaders involved in our combined efforts to secure Florida and our Nation from a transportation security incident and drug trafficking, I thank Congress and, in particular, this committee for the high level of interest in protecting our na-

tion's ports, the global supply chain, and the citizens of Florida. I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today.

Specifically, today I will address, per Congressman Gus Bilirakis' request, the diversity of Florida's ports, my assessment of vessel tracking initiatives, critical maritime vulnerabilities as they impact Florida, observations regarding narcotics smuggling, and challenges we currently face.

### ***Background***

In terms of geography and demography, Florida has many features which make it exceptionally attractive to drug trafficking organizations and, potentially, terrorists. These include an extremely diverse population with strong representation from the Caribbean Basin, Central and South America, and Mexico. Additionally, Florida has approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected continental coastline and the Florida Keys archipelago (that lie astride some of the major drug-trafficking routes into the United States), geographical proximity to "source" countries, and strong cultural ties to countries throughout the region. Florida's international ports of entry must, therefore, be considered critical in the national as well as regional counter-terrorism/counter-drug efforts. Importantly, our counter-terrorism and counter-drug efforts must be considered concurrently in any threat assessment or response planning.

During the last decade, Florida has addressed seriously the daunting task of seaport security. Florida's ports have long been regarded as among the most secure in the nation. Our state and local partnerships are strong; our security standards are well understood; and the implementation of security planning is effective. Our emergency responders are superbly trained having faced the horrific hurricanes in recent years. We are ahead of the nation in developing a biometric port access credential, which if supported by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can be implemented immediately. We have implemented an aggressive all hazards, counter-terrorism response concept with seven (7) Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) encompassing all of our state including our seaports and a statewide Domestic Security Oversight Board. Since September 11, 2001, we have expanded our prevention, preparedness, response, and crisis management capabilities to address terrorism in addition to our initial focus on crime, cargo theft, and drug trafficking.

Most states have two or three ports to secure; Florida has fourteen (14) public deepwater seaports. In addition, our coastline is dotted with hundreds of smaller, privately owned commercial marinas and ports engaged in intra-state as well as inter-state and international business. Florida is home to four of the busiest container ports in the nation, and the top three cruise ports in the world. These ports operate within an exceptionally complex inter-modal transport system that must be carefully considered in counterterrorism and counter-drug operations and planning. Florida enjoys a vibrant and growing economic benefit from these points of entry. Ensuring the continued growth and prosperity of our ports, even as we better secure them from a transportation security incident, drug trafficking, and other illegal activity is of primary concern to Governor Crist, our Congressional Delegation, our legislators, and the citizens of Florida.

The challenge to the security of Florida's seaports is exacerbated by the noteworthy differences from port to port. Each is quite different from the others in terms of parameters of the establishing charter of the port, governance, organizational structure, geography, law enforcement support, labor base, funding mechanisms, and commercial operations. Some provide a full range of cargo and cruise operations. Others offer only specific types of cargo and/or cruise operations. Such diversity may well be regarded as a key contributor to the state's overall economic posture, but it also significantly complicates efforts to standardize security preparedness.

Florida is well served by the Florida Ports Council, the Florida Seaport Transportation Economic Development (FSTED) Council and the top management in each of Florida's deepwater ports. They comprise a community of highly skilled, dedicated, and professional public servants, who are integral in maintaining the balance between commerce and security on our ports. They provide strategic input for the planning, security, and operations of our ports. I am also privileged to chair the legislatively-mandated Seaport Security Standards Council, which is charged to review the existing minimum seaport security standards. This council has also provided an effective forum for discussion of concerns and issues for Florida ports and tenant agencies.

### ***Illegal Drug Trafficking (Includes Drug Smuggling)***

As mentioned earlier, the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking is now well established. However, the nature of the drug trafficking threat is substantially different from a terrorist act. Rather than a major, horrific event or events that typ-

ify a terrorist act, drug trafficking is ongoing. Drug-trafficking is facilitated when cargo volume exceeds monitoring capabilities, vessels remain for lengthy stays, access control is superficial, physical security is limited, security planning is incomplete, law enforcement presence is inadequate, or information security is poor. Accordingly, Florida's minimum security standards emphasize strong access control, law enforcement presence, effective operational guidelines and plans, cargo tracking by tenant partners, and other countermeasures. Despite Florida leading the nation in port security, we remain concerned with our ability to prevent large quantities of drugs from entering our state.

Historically, cocaine trafficking has been the major illegal maritime activity. The fact that our cocaine drug overdose rate has climbed steadily in recent years provide indisputable evidence that cocaine is still available in abundant quantities. Drug trafficking organizations impacting Florida are largely international. Their distribution schemes include multi-state transportation and distribution of illicit drugs at the wholesale level. They supply local drug market areas with cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA (Ecstasy), diverted pharmaceuticals and methamphetamine. These illicit drugs vary in demand across Florida as evidenced by higher demand for methamphetamine in rural areas of the state. Colombians continue to dominate drug and money laundering operations; however, Jamaican, Dominican, Mexican, Bahamian, and Cuban organizations impact drug trafficking in Florida. Interrelated to the drug trafficking problems are violence, human trafficking, and the proliferation of gangs profiting from drug sales. Venezuelan influence and involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering continue to increase. Drug threat assessments at the federal, state, and local levels consistently mention the maritime accessibility to Florida. Our ports, coastline, and waterways provide major access points for drug traffickers.

In 2005, Florida had 1,010,370 registered vessels with 27,204 commercial and 973,859 pleasure boats. These figures do not include out of state commercial, pleasure fishing, and other vehicles that utilize Florida's waterways, often traveling to Caribbean ports. These vast numbers of watercraft, combined with superb navigation technology widely available today, greatly assists small vessel drug smugglers moving around the immense Florida and Caribbean littorals with relative ease and great precision. While the cooperation among federal, state, and local law enforcement is excellent, the sheer volume of vessels and smaller watercraft present a major concern.

Drug seizures and subsequent investigations document that frequently, crewmembers aboard freighters and passengers or crewmembers on cruise ships routinely smuggle drugs into Florida through a "body carry" after the drugs have been concealed aboard the vessel. Cruise ships leaving and entering Florida ports routinely call on drug source and transit countries throughout the Caribbean and Central America. The volume of cargo being moved through our ports is evidenced clearly in Jacksonville. The Port of Jacksonville (JAXPORT) is one of the largest ports in the nation. It ranks among the top containers ports and one of the busiest vehicle handling ports in the United States. In 2005, JAXPORT's three public marine terminals handled a total of 8.4 million tons of cargo, a new tonnage record for the port. JAXPORT now ranks only behind Tampa and Port Everglades in total tonnage. Additionally, nearly 20 privately-owned Marine terminals also operate in Jacksonville's harbor without support or management from JAXPORT. These independent port operations are not under the Florida minimum standards for seaports and are regulated by the US Coast Guard.

Florida has three High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's) funded by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The three HIDTA's develop annual drug threat assessments and coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement operations in 22 of Florida's 67 counties. Drug threat assessments for the remaining 45 counties are being developed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Florida National Guard. Florida also has a significant presence from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). We also are assisted by the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), which has responsibility for the sea approaches to Florida. Collectively, these agencies routinely document and interdict significant quantities of drugs moving in our region.

Vessel tracking poses complex issues involving a myriad of federal and state actors, to include U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol ("CBP") and, for smaller vessels, the Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation. CBP requires that 24 hours before a U.S. bound container is loaded onto a ship in a foreign port that an electronic manifest of that container's contents is sent to the CBP by the shipping company. The Coast Guard in turn must be notified 96 hours before a cargo vessel is scheduled to arrive in a U.S. port of call. During that 96 hour period, the Coast Guard uses an intelligence driven, risk-based process to determine what the appro-



appropriate level of engagement should be for any given commercial vessel arriving at a U.S. port: should that vessel be denied entry? Should the vessel be boarded at sea well outside the U.S. port of call?

For the tracking of smaller vessels, to include the one million or so pleasure craft registered in Florida, Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation supports the funding of the "America's Waterways Watch" program as opposed to the installation of an electronic tracking system on each craft. The tracking of such a large volume of pleasure craft in Florida waterways presents very great electronic challenges, and more importantly, almost insuperable challenges to attempting anything like applying timely analysis and risk-based processes for determining the threat posed by any given small vessel.

As discussed previously Florida's location and geography create a lucrative target for smuggling illegal drugs through our ports. These illegal drugs can then be repackaged or transshipped across the United States. Ongoing efforts to tighten the US/Mexican border create an opportunity for drug-traffickers to increase shipments through the Florida corridor. Nationally, there is increasing evidence that drugs are being transshipped from our region to Europe. Again, the international aspect of drug trafficking impacts Florida, which sits astride these distribution routes. The drug threat assessments are further complicated by current vulnerabilities:

**a. Regional threat versus state response.** Florida is in the middle of a major drug trafficking corridor that includes air, land, and sea approaches. Adjacent states and countries, major transportation hubs, and large bodies of water are part of the corridor. While Florida has many federal, state, and local partners striving to prevent and to interdict drug trafficking, we do not have a regional strategy for response.

**b. Inadequate Resources.** While our federal, state, and local partnerships are strong and effective, there are insufficient staffing at all levels to adequately cover the large geographic area and the volume of vessels, imports and exports, and daily transactions. Non-intrusive inspection technology is being increased, but again is not in sufficient quantities to meet the increasing volumes of goods being moved through our ports. This technology is seldom available outside Florida's 14 public ports.

**c. Internal conspiracies:** Drug trafficking is an illegal, high profitable activity. The insertion or extraction of illegal drugs can occur at any point along the route that otherwise legitimate cargo is being moved. Involvement in this illegal activity is not limited to port personnel but could easily include the vessel's crew or others able to access the cargo on the port (longshoremen, stevedores, checkers, pier superintendents, or communications workers). Unsupervised access to cargo presents opportunities for internal conspiracies.

**d. Tension between commerce and security.** Security costs impact the bottom line for our ports. Perfect security would shut down our ports. There are tradeoffs that must be weighed each day. The tension between maintaining strong security and allowing free flow of commerce is real and a concern for government and port leadership.

**e. Poor information sharing.** Despite the lessons on 9/11, intelligence sharing on our ports is limited. Port directors and security directors seldom have access to intelligence reports. This effort is being addressed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, which is implementing a Florida Fusion Center concept, which will only be successful if information is shared by federal, state, and lanks only behind Tampa. This is not the case today.

**f. Imprecise cargo trafficking.** As discussed, the large volume of cargo traffic overwhelms ports across our country. International agreements, non-intrusive inspection technology and security staffs are all important in addressing the problem. However the volume of cargo being moved exceeds our ability to inspect it.

**g. Federal Agency and State Level Planning.** As I have consistently stated, our federal, state, and local partnerships are effective. However, we do not have a national/regional plan that unifies the drug threat assessments and response plan at all levels of government. These assessments and plans must involve our port directors and leadership.

**h. Proactive Law Enforcement Response.** Law enforcement has traditionally responded to criminal activity immediately and then investigated to determine who/what caused the illegal activity. To prevent a transportation security incident or drug trafficking, law enforcement must be proactive with intelligence based policing. Threat assessments that result in actionable intelligence are necessary to prevent illegal activity. This also requires information sharing and coordinated operations at all levels.

**i. Nexus between drug-trafficking and a transportation security incident is not operationalized.** The connection between drug trafficking and a transportation security incident has been recognized; however, we must improve sharing of lessons learned and analysis of drug trafficking as it might be useful to prevent a future transportation security incident. Sharing of intelligence will be important here also.

**j. Counter-drug operations are difficult to resource.** Military requirements and competing priorities have reduced the emphasis on counter-drug operations in this section of the United States. This is evident in the recent removal of US Army helicopters from the Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) mission that has been successful in interdicting drug trafficking through the Caribbean. Previously, surveillance capabilities were reduced to meet operational requirements worldwide.

**k. Transportation Worker Identification Credential fielding is not optimizing existing technology.** Florida is prepared to implement a biometric credential (TWIC aligned) today. Difficulties in collaboration with TSA are preventing this from being realized.

#### ***How to Close the Gap***

**a. Fix Responsibility.** Drug-trafficking organizations are international. Too often, our response is local or community based. While states are funded by DHS for counter-terrorism, we do not have a regional counter-drug strategy that addresses air, land, and sea approaches to our state. Federal partners, adjacent states, and local agencies must be included in our strategy. We must fix responsibility at the national and regional levels to develop and implement the plan. Someone must be in charge. This will result in synergistic successes in preventing drug trafficking and a transportation security incident.

**b. Develop a regional counter-terrorism and counter-drug strategy.** As mentioned previously, drug-trafficking is an ongoing process with potential to be used as an avenue for terrorists to create a transportation security incident. Many federal, state, and local agencies are involved in counter-drug operations. Most efforts are local. We do not have a coordinated, multi-state, air/land/sea, and law enforcement focused regional strategy to prevent and to respond to a transportation security incident. Regional strategies across the United States should cascade from a national strategy.

**c. Produce a regional drug threat analysis.** While there are multiple drug threat analyses available, we lack a unified assessment that could drive coordinated action in our region. Drug trafficking into Florida occurs through the states that border the Gulf of Mexico (responsibility of the Gulf Coast HIDTA), highway systems from Atlanta (Atlanta HIDTA), water approaches (Joint Inter-agency Task Force South), and air transportation routes. A common drug threat assessment would assist a more unified federal, state, and local response. An excellent way for this to happen is federal and local support of the important fusion center initiative being implemented by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

**d. Share information.** The sharing of information among federal, state, and local law enforcement can be improved. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement is taking the lead to address this problem. The Florida Fusion Center protects our state by incorporating an all crimes/all hazards approach to information sharing. Intelligence “Stovepipes” that contributed to the September 11, 2001 attack on America must be reduced. Privacy considerations and agency policies adversely impact the sharing of law enforcement intelligence today. This is evident each day as Florida struggles with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to align federal and state port access credential. TSA has cited federal laws that preclude sharing criminal background information.

**e. Involve Port Directors and Port Security Staff.** Port staff are not provided daily intelligence updates. They should be screened for security clearance and included in daily intelligence and operations updates that affect ports in Florida and the United States. They should also receive relevant operations planning information that involved ports or the maritime environment. Port staff are included in exercises conducted by our Regional Domestic Security Task Forces. However, this must expand to include intelligence sharing and daily operations interaction.

**f. Prioritize OPBAT.** Operations Bahamas, Turks and Caicos has been an important deterrent of drug-trafficking into Florida for many years. Resources reductions have severely reduced operational capability. Most recently, the United States Army removed its Blackhawk helicopters to support other operations. Prior to the military deployments, significant resources were dedicated to preventing the movement of drugs from source countries. We should return to this level of interdiction as soon as possible. In the interim, we should coordinate existing strategies and resources among all partners.

**g. National Efforts with Regional Emphasis.** The global problem of drug trafficking requires a national and international solution. A formal strategy must be created with fixed responsibilities that involve our seaports, but also the entire inter-modal transportation systems of seaports, airports, railways, highways, and remote entry points. Lessons learned from counter-drug operations must be analyzed for counter-terrorism. Sharing of information from this national initiative is imperative.

### **Conclusion**

Florida is recognized as a national leader in port security. Florida has implemented one of our nation's first drug control strategies. This strategy clearly emphasizes the importance of port security as part of our law enforcement response. We continue to emphasize and to resource drug prevention and drug treatment as equal to law enforcement in our strategic efforts against drugs. While we have strong, effective programs across the state and we have enjoyed significant success in many of our initiatives, drug trafficking continues at an unacceptable level. It will only be reduced with efforts that are synergistically applied with federal, state, and local resources. We thank this Subcommittee for its interest in Florida's and our Nation's security. Your efforts help create the conditions to reduce the illegal drug supply, secure our ports and transportation systems from a transportation security incident, and most importantly, protect our neighborhoods and families. Thank you.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. And I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. And I will remind each member that he or she will have five minutes to question the panel. And now I will recognize myself for questions.

I think what we will do is we will go through a series of questions and, since it is just the two of us, I will say to my colleague we will have plenty of time to ask our questions of the group.

I would like to begin by putting into this statement for the record a Unanimous Consent Request to enter from the Miami River Marine Group, their statement with respect to South Florida Regional Maritime Exchange, Promoting Growth of Waterborne Commerce.

Without objection, it is entered into the record.

## FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FRAN BOHNSACK

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MIAMI RIVER MARINE GROUP

FOR THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

REGARDING

SOUTH FLORIDA REGIONAL MARITIME EXCHANGE

PROMOTING GROWTH OF WATERBORNE COMMERCE

CHAIRWOMAN SANCHEZ, RANKING MEMBER SOUDER, AND DISTINGUISHED SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS, it is my honor to have the opportunity to submit a statement for the record about what the maritime industry is doing to enhance maritime domain awareness around the country, and how a Maritime Exchange would benefit the Southern Florida port business community. My name is Fran Bohnsack and I am the Executive Director of the Miami River Marine Group.

The Miami River Marine Group (MRMG) is a private port cooperative of cargo carriers and marine related industry dedicated to preserving the Miami River as a working river. In the past ten years, improvements in local and international economies have been reflected by an increase in the activity and vitality of the working river.

The Miami River is the fourth largest port in the state of Florida, serving as economic catalyst for the South Florida region and providing vital shipping links to the shallow draft ports of the Caribbean and Central and South America. As a working river, the Miami River's navigation and commercial shipping directly generates millions of tons of cargo each year and thousands of direct and indirect jobs.

Goods shipped from the Miami River are sent to over 80 ports of call in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Just as Miami serves as the gateway to the Americas, the Miami River serves as the shallow draft port for foreign flag vessels coming from similar shallow ports in this part of the world (shallow drafts are necessary for the Miami River which is only 15 feet deep). Economic projections for cargo movement indicate that Miami River shipping growth is expected to continue at a healthy rate.

Among the keys to any successful seaport, including the Miami River, are deep water, adequate storage and berthing facilities, and access to inland transportation networks. Equally important—and often overlooked—to the efficient, cost-effective and safe movement of goods is the information network which ensures that all partners in the transportation chain are aware of the shipping and transit information necessary to promote the flow of commerce.

One of the principal indexes of good management in the maritime field is the turnaround a ship receives in port. Simply stated, the shorter the period between arrival and departure, the better the turnaround; and the lower the costs. Ports which offer faster turnaround times will have an economic advantage over other ports. Yet a great deal of communication is required to ensure a ship is serviced quickly and safely: a berth must be available, pilots must be ordered, tugs must be scheduled, linemen must be in place to handle the lines as the ships come alongside, labor must be available, and federal agency inspections must be closely coordinated with the vessel's arrival to eliminate unnecessary delays. All of these activities depend on up-to-the minute communication of any changes in the vessel movement schedule.

These are just a few of the activities which must take place each time a ship arrives in port. In addition, storage and transportation must be arranged, entry must be made on the merchandise, chandlers must deliver food and other supplies, the crew must be paid, and so on. The list of people who must be kept apprised of ship movements is a lengthy one, and given the number of factors which can conspire to delay a commercial cargo vessel, the schedules are often outdated the moment they are reported. Keeping the interested parties informed of changes is often a full-time job for those who are charged with the responsibility to do so.

Many port communities have addressed this need by forming trade associations to acquire, preserve, and disseminate maritime and other business information. These organizations, known as Maritime Exchanges, are non-profit organizations which develop expertise in the areas of Ship Reporting and conduct other activities designed to promote trade and commerce in their regions.

Maritime Exchanges are dedicated to providing information, communications and other services in order to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound maritime operations. These maritime information service organizations represent the commercial maritime community's shared commitment to proactively address the challenges faced by the maritime industry, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and other federal and state agencies in a cooperative and cost efficient manner.

While not all of the 351 seaports throughout the U.S. enjoy the benefits of a Maritime Exchange, it is certainly noteworthy that all of the top ports, and several of the smaller ones, have recognized the need to centralize the collection and distribution of maritime information through an Exchange. Maritime Exchanges are vital to the maritime industry and their government partners in Baltimore, British Columbia, Jacksonville, Alaska, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Hawaii, Southern California, New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River and Bay, New Orleans, Virginia, Texas and Portland, Oregon.

Several of the people who oversee the operations of these maritime exchanges are former Coast Guardsmen and have served as Captains of the Port at various places, and all the people who run these maritime exchanges have extensive maritime experience, including as licensed master mariners, and senior maritime industry executives. For those ports in which no Exchange is located, undoubtedly much of the same work is being performed, yet in many instances, those who receive the inquiries or create the reports—pilots, harbor masters, port authorities, agents, and others—must do so in addition to their normal responsibilities.

Although the majority of Maritime Exchanges were formed in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the need for Exchanges is equally evident today. While information sharing was certainly challenging in the era of the telegraph and telegram, the average ship transit was several times longer than today's voyages. Today, transit times are shorter, and communicating information among transportation partners is light years faster. With the advent of new technologies, changes in shipping patterns, ever larger vessels, and increasingly stringent maritime security measures, the challenges to the maritime sector are progressively more complex. As a result, two new Exchanges have formed in the last few years, and several other port communities are considering forming Exchanges, as well.

Exchanges exist to keep members informed on a variety of matters, not the least of which are the ever-important vessel schedules. Yet most Exchanges also address the myriad issues surrounding commercial port operations, such as pending legislation, new regulatory requirements, the growing federal agency information reporting requirements, increasing crew, passenger, and cargo inspections, and advances in technologies associated with vessel, cargo and crew processing. These are just a few of the reasons why the Miami River Marine Group has been working to establish a Maritime Exchange in Southern Florida.

Like any trade association, Exchanges serve as a venue under which often competing port interests can come together to address issues of mutual concern, or to identify opportunities for improvement to the overall community.

Exchanges can also help identify trends in shipping that can be used to both facilitate daily operations and undertake long-term strategic planning. They can coordinate training programs, such as hazardous material transportation or security, and in some cases, they will lobby for the rights of industry. Often tagged "the voice of the port," an Exchange will unite members under a single umbrella to oppose or support initiatives as they arise. Like other trade associations, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: with each additional member, the Exchange voice is strengthened exponentially.

And of course, Exchanges can be good opportunities for networking, putting members in touch with others who have similar interests to find or obtain new business relationships and share ideas.

Why is a Maritime Exchange needed in Southern Florida? Although some of the activities described above are consistent with other trade associations, Marine Exchanges are unique because of their day-to-day operating role in their communities. Although the full scope of activities undertaken by each Exchange in the U.S. differs based on the unique needs of its port community, all provide the same basic Ship Reporting services:

**Ship Reporting:** Exchange watchstanders, most of whom operate 24/7, track vessel movements via traditional means, such as contact with the vessel agents, pilots and others with vessel schedule information, as well as through AIS or satellite technologies. They enter the information into their databases and make it available on a real-time basis to those with a right or a need to know. With the information consolidated into a central community database, Exchanges can then distribute reports of historical, current and estimated ship movement activities to their members. Using a neutral organization such as an Exchange alleviates concerns over sharing what might be considered proprietary commercial information.

In addition, vessel agents use Exchanges to transmit instructions or other information to their ships while en route, and the ships' masters or pilots will contact the Exchange with a variety of questions, such as whether water is available at the berth, what time tugs will be alongside, etc.

Unlike their federal counterparts who rotate in and out of ports on a frequent basis, Exchange staff members are specifically trained in local port operations and develop institutional memories. As a result, they often serve as the "eyes and ears" of the port community and law enforcement agencies, and can detect and report anomalies when appropriate.

**Vessel Particulars:** Private and public sector port operators often have a need to obtain detailed information about ships as they enter port. From length, breadth and weight, to owners, previous names, P&I Club, and safety certificate expiration dates, Exchanges are repositories for a wide-range of vessel information.

**Community Information Clearinghouse:** Exchanges are often conduits between federal agencies or state authorities and the local communities. They collect, broadcast and store navigation restriction notices, security bulletins, bridge openings, dredging schedules, and a host of other information.

**Answering Services:** Many Exchanges also operate 24-hour answering services for their members. In addition to traditional message taking functions, often Exchanges are prepared to respond to the questions or messages from callers—many of which are related to a particular vessel's schedule. These answering services can be utilized during lunchtimes, holidays, nights, weekends or any combination of the above. Subscribers have the choice to have callers patched through to their cell phones, messages emailed, or messages held for pickup.

**Publications:** Newsletters, port directories, and other publications keep members informed and present revenue opportunities through advertising and/or subscriptions.

**Other Services:** There are any number of roles Exchanges can play in support of their port communities. Some may manage job posting bulletin boards, serve as harbor safety or area maritime security secretariats, or offer boarding agent services. The list of programs and services can be as long or as short as needed by the local community.

**Other Automation Services:** These may include:

- *Cargo manifesting:* Exchanges, like port authorities, may operate community-based cargo manifesting and release systems for their communities. In addition to helping port customers comply with reporting regulations mandating the use of the CBP Automated Manifest System, these types of community-based systems centralize receipt and distribution of messages pertaining to cargo status (inspection required, cargo released, cargo held, etc.).

*eNOA/D:* With the June 05 requirement for electronic crew/passenger manifesting via the Coast Guard's electronic Notice of Arrival/Departure system, several Exchanges have stepped in to help their communities achieve compliance in a cost-effective manner.

*PORTS:* In partnership with the National Ocean Service, Exchanges serve as local sponsors for their regions' Physical Oceanographic Real Time Systems.

In order for an Exchange to succeed in Southern Florida, it must have the buy-in of the local maritime constituencies. These may include both private-sector port businesses, public port authorities, and federal, state, local agencies, and elected officials, if appropriate. Specific organizations may include:

- Pilots
- Container and bulk carriers
- Cruise ship operators
- Steamship agents
- Port Authorities/terminal operators/stevedores
- Warehouse operators
- Tug/barge companies

- Trucking/rail companies
- Importers/exporters
- Brokers/forwarders
- Labor
- Admiralty law firms, banks, insurance companies
- Surveyors, fumigators, and other service providers
- U.S./State/County legislators
- Law Enforcement
- Key Federal Agencies: CBP, Coast Guard, USDA, FDA, COE, etc.

Needless to say the initial organizational issues will take some period of time to resolve. Once these issues are resolved, however, members of the Southern Florida port business community will be well-positioned to launch an organization that will benefit all maritime stakeholders in the region.

While a pool of initial start up funds will be necessary to open the doors, the distinct advantage of a Maritime Exchange over other types of associations lies in the fact the Exchange can develop a suite of programs and services which can be offered on a for-fee basis to ensure the continued viability of the organization over the long term. While membership dues remain an important component of an association's revenue stream, the organization is funded primarily by those who use its many services.

There will be individuals who resist the concept. These persons may believe they are getting the services they need today at no cost, so why should they pay to fund a new organization. The response is clear: Southern Florida ports are doing well today, but could they do better? Conversely, can these same ports be kept from slipping in the face of an ever-increasing competitive global shipping industry? Can steps be taken to ensure that costly new federal regulations do not over-burden port businesses?

The answer to all these questions is yes, and an Exchange is one mechanism to achieve those important goals.

I would like to thank you, Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity submit this statement today. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Let's see, what questions do I have for you all?

I would like to begin with asking about, now, Captain, that we have so much of an emphasis going on terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts, how are your resources? Is the Coast Guard in this area still getting to the things it used to do, before we put all these other responsibilities on you? You know, pleasure craft, safety issues, search and rescue. Or has that affected your performance? Resources, have they been drawn away from the original things that the Coast Guard used to do? Do you need more help in that area?

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chairman, here, locally, Coast Guard Sector Miami and the entire Seventh District has always been a very operationally fast-paced location within the Coast Guard.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, it was in 2004 that we created the first Sector Command here. And I think that move has actually served us incredibly well. We married together what was the former Group Operations, which did the boating safety, the boardings, the search and rescue, with the former Captain of the Port functions, which involved the full spectrum of marine safety, pollution response. We put that under one command.

We have had some synergies that have stemmed from that. The operational resources and the regulatory authorities are all nestled in one place.

Our missions have clearly grown, as you indicated, since 9/11. Maritime Homeland Security was a smaller slice of what we do. Today it constitutes probably a quarter or so of our total allocation of effort.

Our operations have grown with those new responsibilities. The Coast Guard has grown at large, close to 4,000 billets on the macro sense. Here, locally, I couldn't give you the exact specifics on our bodies. I jumped onto the organization here in 2006, in the new framework we are operating in.

We are well staffed and funded for our responsibilities. We are busy, but I don't think we have had any letdown in service delivery to the public down here.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you, Captain.

Here is the problem that I have, and one of the reasons I wanted to visit the Miami Port and see and get your testimony on record. I don't know which one of you mentioned that there are probably over a hundred thousand pleasure boats registered here, between the three or four ports just in the immediate area.

You know, when were talking about identifying ships, boats, whatever, most of the pleasure—almost all the pleasure craft don't have a tracking monitor to them, or what have you.

What do we do? I mean, what is your best concept? And I will ask all three of you about what we do with these pleasure craft with respect to going off to some island and picking up people who shouldn't be in this country that are being brought in, or drug trafficking, or contraband smuggling. I mean, what is the best idea you all have come up with? Because I know you haven't done it yet. I mean, you have done layering, you have done some projects, some pilot projects, but what do you think in the long run? What do we do about a port like Miami, that has so many pleasure craft attached to it?

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, Madam Chairman, I threw out the number of 170,000 vessels here in southeast Florida in three counties alone, so I will take the first stab at that question.

I guess what we are doing is we do employ a layered defense, and there are many different threats. We have the threat of a terrorist type of activity in a seaport, we have the threats of illegal migrant smuggling, illegal drug smuggling. The other missions we have down here, people violating our living marine resources; we have a lot of rich resources out here, fishes and coral reefs and things. We are involved in all those missions.

What we do currently is we try to get our arms around the domain as best we can with the available sensor information we have. We employ a layered strategy to that. We have cutters; Sector Miami has Coast Guard cutters. We don't control the aviation assets, the airplanes and helicopters directly, but we have an air station that services two sectors down here. We have flights most every day of the week. We partner with Customs and Border Protection, who has an air marine operation down here.

So, generally, we have maritime patrol aircraft flying over the Straits of Florida, with the outer approaches, looking for vessels of interest coming across. We have our small boat stations. We have four multi-mission small boat stations that fall under my command here. We have those vessels on patrol. Our state partners, such as the Fish and Wildlife Commission, our local partners, have marine units that are on the water. And through those layered vessels, we are trying to stop those vessels that stand out as possibly intending mal-intent over, you know, legitimate business.



That does get very challenging. The recreational vessel versus the vessel that is posing a threat, look the same down here. Do we have visibility on all the smaller vessels? As I mentioned in my statement, that clearly is an area where there is room for improvement. I think we have the challenge of the larger vessels, the commercial vessels; we have good domain and awareness on them through our classified and unclassified common operational pictures. There are new initiatives mentioned, such as Long-Range Identification Tracking that will come and bring even added value to that.

But there is a legitimate challenge on small vessels. But we are employing day-to-day layered security. And it is presence, it is maritime cops on the beat on the water, it is intelligence. Intelligence is clearly a key component of that, too. And then we respond within the best of our capabilities to those threats.

Ms. SANCHEZ. But, Captain, I have friends who have pleasure boats here who say it is very rare to see a Coast Guard cutter out there in the bay or, if there is, there is one, and most people know what time it goes out. And, I mean, these friends I have, and various say, you know, we could take our boat, go pick somebody up off an island, come back in. They have told me about the fact that, you know, if they were to do such a thing, they are supposed to go up the river and pick up the phone at some given spot and call in to the airport and talk to who is ever on the other end, I guess, of CVP and tell them they are in town. They say, yeah, Xerox a copy on Monday of your passport and send it in to us by mail.

I mean, do we need more resources, or is just putting a station closer or easier for people to follow? I mean, even my friends say, why should we do that? Why should we go upriver six miles or eight miles and go and do that, only to get somebody out at the airport and it doesn't really matter? I mean, we could be telling them there is only four of us on the boat, versus ten of us on the boat. And they could care. They don't really know.

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, Congresswoman—

Ms. SANCHEZ. What do we do? What do we do? What do we do—can we do anything about it?

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, I think what we do do is we put our best capabilities forward. You mentioned a program that is actually run by Customs and Border Protection. It is their arrivals, vessels that come in from overseas that, typically, down here, it is a lot of times the Bahamas. That is about 50 miles away at its closest point. And they have a local boater option. It is one scenario where they can call in and they are pre-screened and there is a certain level of legitimacy that goes with their registry in that program.

But the small vessels, there isn't sufficient resource when you are talking 170,000 small boats alone in this region, and that is a small sub-set of our region, where you are going to see every boat, every day.

And I think as we look forward and try to get our arms around this thing called Maritime Domain Awareness, hopefully, you know, we are looking in the Coast Guard at a future major acquisition called Command 21, that will hopefully bring better sensors, better information management systems to integrate information

from those sensors and databases, intelligence sources, to a product.

Ideally, we need to see what is out in the area, we need to understand the threats it posed, we need to be able to share that information with our partners.

So the short answer to your question is do we have—are there sufficient resources in my area every day to look at every boat coming in? Clearly not.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Where I am headed with this is, you know, as the Chairwoman who also oversees all entry into the United States, and exits from the United States, as we tighten other areas, people will look for the areas that are least protected. And this seems to be pretty wide open, from my standpoint. So getting you all to really think about three, four years down the line, when we have actually got other places under control, this is going to be a sector that is going to be hit, I think. Hit in the sense of getting people into this country that we probably don't want here.

I see that Colonel over there has—

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, your question, I would offer two responses. One, the integrated strategy that I talked about before, I will bet your friends have, in some cases, seen a sheriff's craft patrolling the water. And I think an integrated approach that takes all the law enforcement, all resources, is something that drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, should be unified with all resources that we have, and not just put it on the Coast Guard.

The second point, I believe, as a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device, a suicide/homicide bomber, we are going to have to have an awareness effort in our communities, our neighborhoods. Likewise, those who have small crafts need to be alerted to the threat, and, when there is unusual or threatening behavior, a system to report it.

The Fish and Wildlife Conservation group here in Florida expressed some concern to me about funding that may be taken away from Americas Waterway Watch Program, which was intended to do that, to provide that awareness, to encourage the dialogue that these 1,000,000 pleasure craft in Florida, that a lot of them would be sensitive, as good citizens, to that threat and might report something.

I think it is far beyond the Coast Guard or any local law enforcement to check all this. But, as in a neighborhood, collectively, we as citizens, I think, can do something about it, to prevent it.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Did you have any comment?

Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, I do. I think there is really three areas. It is a very complex problem. Just knowing that a vessel is coming in, a pleasure craft is coming in, in a free and open society like we have, it is almost impossible to be able to take every pleasure craft, vet it, understand who is on board and what their intent is. It really just isn't going to happen that way in the real world.

It would be nice if we could solve it with technology and we could solve it with just, you know, applying more people to it.

I think what you have to do, there is several things to help along the way, but it doesn't quite get you all the way. One is you have to be able to free up the people that are busy doing the grunt work, that can focus and use their talents on looking for anomalies. And,

again, not to say technology-generated things here, but things that are suspicious. Suspicious behavior. Whether it is from the sheriff's office or from the Coast Guard, or whoever is out there.

The second is, you have to start applying technologies and trying to push the state of the art of some of these technologies. Which I believe the Coast Guard is doing. They are working pretty hard on things. I have referenced in my statement this Automated Scene Understanding. To be able to classify and understand who are these vessels. But not just that they exist there, but what is the pattern. Are they doing something that is unusual? You know, is there something happening at a period of time at night? What is going on? A particular size craft.

Those might be the things that, if you could automatically sense that and alert watch-standers, that would go a long way to look into anomalous behavior. Because, again, just knowing that they are a sport fisher really doesn't gain us anything.

And, lastly, I think the other big thing is there has to be a more effective way to share information between all the port partners. There has to be a way where we can get past they are trying to unclassify or keep so many things close to the vest. And I think there is a willingness. At least, what I have seen in the Coast Guard, as well as in Florida, there is a willingness to do that. The question now is trying to figure out the proper way to make that happen, and make it happen fairly rapidly.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

I will defer some questions and give some time to my colleague from Florida.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.

I want to follow up on Chairman Sanchez's question. Does the Coast Guard have policies—and this is addressed to Captain Schultz, of course—does the Coast Guard have policies and procedures for identifying, tracking, and responding to the increasing small vessel threat? If not, are there plans to develop these policies and procedures in the near future?

Captain SCHULTZ. Congressman, we, as I mentioned in response to the Madam Chairman, we are very concerned with any vessel posing any type of a threat. The small vessels, I think, bring a unique challenge in that our current suite of sensors is best suited for larger vessels, the radars that we employ.

Obviously, when we are talking about flying airplanes, maritime patrol aircraft at sea, larger vessels are easier to detect than a small, unlit, fast vessel. Those are the type of vessels that we are challenged with right now, that are smuggling illegal migrants or smuggling drugs.

Do we have a plan or a policy? I am going to leave the policy aspects, I think, to the folks in Washington. Here, locally, our plan is to apply the given resources we have generic to the Coast Guard, force-multiply that, as Colonel Janes talked about, with our state and local partners through a coordinated effort. We have many coordinating bodies. We coordinate some of the seaport aspects through the area of Maritime Security Committee and Subcommittees. We coordinate some of the other waterfront and coastal-type activities in support of migrant interdiction or drugs through entities like the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, where we

meet on a recurring basis with our state and federal law enforcement partners. As a matter of fact, we are meeting tomorrow here. And that is all my state and local partners on the waterfront; we will get together and talk about what the current threats are, what has happened since we last met.

So, again, the policy piece, I think is best addressed at the National Coast Guard level. Here, locally, we are employing tools like the Hawkeye System, which I mentioned we were the initial test site. I think that is at five or six other Coast Guard locations.

We have the Visualization Tools Project, which is helping us automate some of those functions where there used to be a watchstander thumbing through databases or flipping switches on different types of sensors. Now these †† the Visualization Tools brings some automation to that. There is alerts we can set. If a vessel with automatic identification system comes in—I am talking a bigger vessel now—if that vessel comes in early, and we have some rules established with those tools, an alert goes off that that vessel is here before we expected it. That is very much simplified than an individual flipping through lists to see when those vessels are due and then correlating that to what he sees in the radar and all the different AIS depictions on the screen.

So we are doing things. We are embracing those technologies we have. There clearly is room for enhanced technologies, better sensors, better integration of sensor data and other sources of information to make us more effective. But here, locally, we are applying what we have generic to the Coast Guard, partnering it up with state and local partners, Department of Defense assets that come in on occasion to support us with maritime patrol aircraft. And we are doing, you know, due diligence to the task at hand.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Captain.

Captain, what is the status of the Coast Guard's Long-Range Identification Tracking Program?

Captain SCHULTZ. Sir, as I understand the status, it is, you know, there are requirements set forth in the Safe Port Act. Here, locally, I am not on the cutting edge of the status of that rollout. My understanding is, you know, when that comes, that will bring some enhanced information on long-range tracking of vessels, vessels that are transiting within a thousand miles of our coastline. We will be aware of that.

Right now, here, locally, I have visibility with Hawkeye, through the ability to detect and analyze AIS tracks out to 30, 40, 50 miles into the Straits of Florida.

Long-range tracking will bring us visibility, as I am sure you are aware, on all U.S. vessels anywhere in the world; on other vessels 300 gross tons or larger making approaches to U.S. ports.

As far as the actual specific status, the funding, that is a little bit out of my lane down here, sir.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Well, I will look into that further.

Colonel Janes, I have a few questions, if I may. Would you please briefly explain some of the differences between Florida's diverse ports and the challenges those differences present in securing them?

Colonel JANES. Certainly, Congressman.

The—I chair the Florida Seaports Security Standards Council, and we look at the minimum standards, but also have talked many issues across our state.

The different governing structures will indicate how ports are funded, the private businesses that they orchestrate. In some of our ports, they have security personnel that come from the local sheriff's office. In other cases, they are hired.

The standards of certified law enforcement versus hired security and who should be manning different checkpoints, all come up to be critical issues that costs the ports funding, but also get into the interpretation of the standard and how well it is being applied.

The involvement of local government in the ports, again, if the county is heavily participating in the funding, the local governance could be a board that is comprised of different members across the state.

The bottom line, Congressman, is there is no standard model for 14 ports. And the fact that we do have 14 ports, the governance is varied, the businesses that they transact, some do all, cargo, cruise, all business that a major port would do. Others do a very focused level. So each port has to be adjusted.

The great discussion that addresses your question is in the Seaport Security Standards Council, we just had a major discussion about should versus shall. And in many of the standards, the word from the Florida statute is should. And that recognition is the ports vary significantly, that you cannot put a uniform standard on every port. The inspector who is checking with compliance must go in and determine has that port done everything possible within the intent of the standard.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much.

I am please that you highlighted the importance of the America's Water Watch Program in your written testimony. I am a strong proponent of that.

Would you please briefly explain the benefits of this program—and you did go through it—and its importance in increasing Maritime Domain Awareness?

Colonel JANES. Again, Congressman, my understanding, and, again, working with our Fish and Wildlife partners who we look to for the small craft security in Florida, in addition to our local partners, the focus of the program that they have made me aware of, that if we lose it, I would be concerned, is that it really is an awareness, an education of what are the expectations of navigation in Florida's waterways, and what could be the different threats. What are illegal actions, suspicious action? And it also helps to translate to our boat operators, vessel operators, that they, too, have a responsibility in security. It is not just the funded, the governmental aspect. That they can prevent a terrorist act, a transportation security incident, and an illegal act, drug trafficking, by reporting it.

So it is awareness, involvement, not unlike what we would want in our community neighborhoods.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Are you in favor of expanding the program?

Colonel JANES. Absolutely. I think it is essential to what we do, both air, land and sea. We—we can't fund enough protection against drug trafficking and a terrorist act.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you very much. Appreciate it very much. Thank you.

Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. We will go to second round of questions. I have some questions on—to both Captain Schultz and to Mr. Dryden.

Viz Tools. Can you expand on how Viz Tools operates and what components make the Viz Tools, and what role does The Mariners Group/Command Bridge Software have within Viz Tools?

Captain SCHULTZ. Defer to you first, then talk——

Mr. DRYDEN. All right.

Captain SCHULTZ. ——about our applications or——

Mr. DRYDEN. Yeah, I will shy away from the operational side, and let you do that.

But just from a technology standpoint, one of the big problems, as I talked about, was there is a lot of information flowing into a Command Center. Some of that could just be manual and telephonic, other is electronic from all these new systems.

One of the major problems is how do you take something—how do you take all that and put it together into something meaningful. Just the fact that you have a lot of blips out there doesn't really mean anything. So trying to get to this actionable situation awareness is a real issue.

So, to your question about how is it made up, there is really multiple parts. The first one is how do you fuse all that information together. Once you have that, so instead of just radar standing stand-alone, and AIS stand-alone, and all these other systems out there, once you find a way to bring those together, then you can start applying the second part, which is anomaly detection. So you can create business rules, as Captain Schultz was mentioning earlier, you can create those business rules, or doctrine, to go look for certain circumstances, for anomalies.

So if you can find those anomalies with those business rules, A, you are going to do two things. One is you will find it when it happens, but the other is you are not going to have to divert your watch-standers from always looking for those situations, because you have another way to achieve that. So the watch-standers, then, are free to take action and look around for other things that are happening.

And as the Coast Guard has increasing mission areas, you know, it becomes more and more of an issue of if you have a lot more to do, how do you figure a way to get there quickly.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what are the data points? I mean, how—is that coming off the radar? Is it only ships that have automated systems? I mean, wha——

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, it is very—it really depends on the sensors and the systems. For instance, the today AIS, it really is the large vessels that have that. The commercial vessels coming in and out of here. So you are going to see those. And then you may see it on radar, but you are not going to know who they are, you know, if it is a small boat. You will know who all the big guys are. We correlate a lot of that information. But when it becomes a small craft, you really don't know. You may be able to tell that it is a particular

type of vessel or so many feet. Even then, you are really using cameras to figure that kind of stuff out.

So one of the big problems in the big exposures, I think, that exist in the nation, is figuring a way around that. To figure out which ones, A, are small boats, but then, do they have behavior that would require us to take action, number one.

And number two is, the other piece of this, is intel. You have to be able to find a way to funnel intel, outside of just looking at the tactical operation. You have to know in advance, by intel, which is generally local intel. It could be from overseas, but in a small boat thing, you are generally going to look at the local law enforcement and what they hear on the streets and whatnot. You have to have a conduit.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So they are calling it in or they are—the local intel.

Mr. DRYDEN. If it is—

Ms. SANCHEZ. It is called in, it is coming over the fax or the wires, something? How—

Mr. DRYDEN. Right. I will let the Captain speak to the operational side of how they physically receive it, but, generally, yeah, you are getting manual intel that comes in, or you are getting phone calls that happen from-from—port partners.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Captain?

Captain SCHULTZ. Congresswoman, he talked about the Visualization Tools product. The product that were testing, the Command Bridge from Mariner Group, as a proof-of-concept, that type of product does bring some of the automation to what before was a human-intensive project. We have a Watch Center, with a team of five watch-standers in there, and we have a sensor operator. We have folks that are working different systems, database systems.

A visualization-type tool can bring to that Command Center those automatic alerts. It can integrate sensor data, information, present a visual, a graphic visual for the watch-stander. If there is a search and rescue case going on, it can automatically populate, based on rules, that case, up on a status board. It can show us, if you fold in the capabilities of something called Blue Force Tracking, where our friendly forces, their positions are updated. Right now, we have that and it is manually updated. The watch-stander can look at that visual depiction and see where the Coast Guard resources are, partner law enforcement resources are, see the challenge at hand, better connect the dots, and get the right resource to the challenge.

From the security in the seaport standpoint, I mentioned 9,000 vessel arrivals here. In Port Everglades, in Port of Miami, where we have cameras with the Hawkeye system, we can feed the radar signature of that vessel. The bigger vessel, we may pick up on radar 20 miles out. We can see the AIS signature. We can see the radar signature.

The Visualization Tools Project will take that AIS signal, and I mentioned an example before, if that vessel is in before its advance notice of arrival, with some parameters that are established in there in terms of alerts, we will get an automatic alert that that vessel is here early, before its intended arrival. That—the watch-stander will be immediately keyed to that. Otherwise, that watch-

stander will be flipping through reams of paper, flipping through drop-down screens on computers, and trying to get to that same outcome. This is using automation to put more information, better situational information, at the fingertips of our watch-standers for, hopefully, you know, better security out the back side.

Ms. SANCHEZ. You mentioned proof-of-concept. Can you tell me how far along you are and if this is going to have a—if you think it is going to have a positive outcome?

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, this—the proof-of-concept, we had the Command Bridge product for a couple months, and then some of the—some of the feeds were turned off. We have just recently been informed from the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate that we have a six-month assessment—extension of our period to assess the product. And, based on our initial assessments of the Visualization Tools, the watch-standers, I as the Sector Commander, we did see value there. The ability to take information and better process sensors and databases, and bring that together, versus just one more box in the Command Center, it is clearly a good utility.

So some type of visualization tool, some type of information management system, I think will be a key component in our Command 21 way forward, where we are hoping to bring greater capabilities to our Command Centers.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you see, if, in fact, you get through the concept and you—do you see the Coast Guard maybe applying it in other ports?

Captain SCHULTZ. I think the—I think some type of a visualization tool product, some type of an information management system will clearly be part of our—of our, you know, way ahead with regards to Command Centers.

This is one prototype, proof-of-concept beta test we are doing with this product. I am not really privy to what we are doing elsewhere in the country for trying comparable products, but, you know, feedback on what we have in hand, it has been a value add.

We are excited about—we just got the extension for six more months here, so we are excited to put it through its paces for a few more months. And probably six months from now, I could be able to report out a lot more detail about exactly what it does bring to the table.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Maybe we will bring you to Washington to do that.

Colonel Janes, do you think that the Coast Guard has enough assets in South Florida? And if the Coast Guard had more resources in South Florida, how do you think they should use them? And would more resources help us in effectively decreasing drug trafficking in the region?

Colonel JANES. Unquestionably, more resources would help us.

Ms. SANCHEZ. What type of resources?

Colonel JANES. I would defer to the professionals in the Coast Guard. As a former Army officer, and having watched the major expansion of the Coast Guard mission in recent years, I would take great hesitancy in trying to define for the Coast Guard what they need, if I didn't serve in the Coast Guard.

But I do know their resources, they are stretched. Every time I watch with their different mission requirements and what they



have been asked to do, funding, I am sure that they would agree they would do better had they had more resources. But I would not offer a specific example.

Ms. SANCHEZ. The reason I ask is because you are sort of in charge of sort of trying to take a look at that, and, as you know, somebody who sits under the administration, Coast Guard, for example, isn't really allowed to tell us they need more resources unless the administration wants them to tell us they need more resources. Of course, they don't want them to tell us that, because the budget is already put forward.

So I am just asking you, as an observer, what is going on down here. Do you think they could use more resources?

Colonel JANES. Oh, I don't think there is any question.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would they be put to good use?

Colonel JANES. I think it is absolutely imperative that we try to resource them for their mission. Their missions been expanded, but I have not seen a similar expansion of their resources in recent years. And their ability to respond would be, in my thinking, in conjunction with the local and national partners who could work in the region as they do.

But certainly, one of the major points of my testimony is we are under-resourced to respond to the threat that we have.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

Captain, the Coast Guard dry-docked the 123-foot cutters that would have been used in the waters off of south Florida last year. Has this impacted your operational readiness here in South Florida? And, again, do you have enough resources to properly fulfill your mission?

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chairman, kind of two questions in there, and I will deal with following the—Colonel Janes here.

Regarding the resources, the administration budget as proposed does, in fact, ensure our ability to do all our missions. Were additional resources to be directed to the Coast Guard, I am clear that there is good applications we could make of those, and deliver more service.

Regarding the 123-foot cutters, as you mentioned, that were taken out of service a handful of months ago, actually, close to a year ago now, we have come up with what we think are some fairly creative strategies to mitigate that gap. Here at Sector Miami, I have eight patrol boats that work under our tactical control, that are home port in our region. Four of those are 110-foot cutters. The other four are 87-foot coastal patrol boats.

We have worked with my fellow Sector Commanders in Key West and St. Petersburg. We have actually taken those platforms, those 110-foot platforms, that had a 16-person crew before, and we have actually married them us with the crews from those eight decommissioned, or eight out-of-service 123-foot cutters. We are now multi-crewing those vessels.

A patrol boat that used to give us 2200 operational hours a year is now delivering 3500 operational hours through multi-crewing. So the vessel is out more, the crews, the burden on the crews is no further time away from home. We are pushing the vessel harder. Obviously, the maintenance side of it, we have to sink a few more dollars into it. We have to really have a good strategy in place to

deal with the challenges of running what are already old vessels harder. But I think we have hit that pretty well.

Are we anxiously looking forward to new cutters coming through our recapitalization efforts? Absolutely. But here, in the interim, I think we have managed to close that gap and deal with that challenge fairly well.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Mr. Dryden, your testimony says that the current state of technology in today's ports is not sufficient to track non-cooperative vessels and small boats. What steps do you think should be taken to address that issue?

Mr. DRYDEN. Well, from a technology standpoint, you really have to have technology that can do things like pattern analysis, that can look, when they turn off—the cooperating vessels are going to turn on all their sensors. You are going to see them, and it is, you know, well-behaved vessels coming in are going to come in, and it is not going to be a problem.

The legislation currently, I can't speak to. But I can speak to the projects that I know are underway that are partially funded at this point. And those projects are seeking to identify all of those, and look for anomalous behavior. So that, in fact, when you find something, somebody that should have—that should have their transponders on and they don't, that is the kind of thing that needs to light up in a Command Center, so they can take the action, when you have the small boats that aren't, in the first place, going to have those sensors.

But, you know, the Coast Guard has attempted to push down the requirement and to get cooperation from small boaters. But, really, it is a daunting task without getting in the small boater's way.

So, as they work through that to figure what is the right compromise, you really have to solve it with technology. And, again, I would—I would offer that, with the Safe Port Act and with the funding of the Safe Port Act, it really allows the Coast Guard to spend more consistent dollars over time to reach those objective.

But when they are having to piecemeal it together, you know, when DHS and S&T apply dollars to do projects they think have value, you know, we are really taking too much time getting from start to finish, because they only have a certain number of dollars to use.

So the promise of the Safe Port Act, and, hopefully, Command 21, being an acquisition program, is they are going to be able to lay all that out and actually execute on those. Today, what they are having to do is they are having to work around and find the dollars and, you know, kick and scream and figure out a way to fund some of these things.

And the net result is it just takes too long to achieve it. They have the will to do it; it is just a matter of getting the dollars aligned with that to make it happen.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have another set of questions?

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Just a couple. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Uh-huh.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Again, Colonel Janes, do you believe it is possible to track small vessel threats in a meaningful manner, given the sheer volume of pleasure crafts in Florida's waterways?

Colonel JANES. I don't believe we can do it with technology. I think it goes back to an awareness, and everybody in the waterways cooperating. I think technology has a role, but it would take an integrated system. And it would be very complex, not unlike a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device that I mentioned before. Just too many, too spread, too hard.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Maybe, briefly, the rest of the panel can comment on that?

Mr. DRYDEN. I would agree with that. I think that—I think that is correct.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Yes, sir?

Captain SCHULTZ. And I would add, Congressman, I think we can bring greater visibility, greater awareness to that population. Can you resolve all challenges with small boats? Probably not. But you can—we can do better than we are now with enhanced technologies. And, again, I mentioned the Command 21. I think that is kind of where we are hoping to go, and, you know, the Coast Guard is looking at ways, partnering with all the stakeholders in that small arena. There is obviously strong—strong views there, but I think we can do more there.

Can we completely solve it? You know, that will—that is yet to be determined, I guess.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. DRYDEN. Congressman, can I make one point? The Interagency Operational Centers that—that Command 21 or that the Safe Port Act dictate, that is exactly the kind of thing, I think, where it becomes the venue, it becomes the forum in which to do that. And there has already been test beds, for lack of a better work, but project through DOJ, such as Seahawk in Charleston, that have anticipated and kind of worked through a lot of the issues of, you know, what are the procedures, what are the lessons learned from trying to get a lot of different, disparate organizations to work together and share intel. I think with layer—and it is targeted as, you know, at least in part, as a model going forward for these Command Centers, for the Interagency Command Centers.

So I think there is a lot to be learned there, where we can apply it and, hopefully, get closer to solving the problem by using that.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you.

Mr. Dryden, would you please explain how Command Bridge helps improve and facilitate actionable situational awareness and help watch-standers differentiate between what is important and what is not?

Mr. DRYDEN. Sure. The biggest thing is being able to take all those disparate systems and fuse them together, because once you have done that, now the sum of these things, when you look at it, you can start applying those rules across everything.

As an example, if you have a—if you have a vessel that you are just looking at with AIS, and you know where they are, you don't have the ability, without using something like Viz Tools, you don't have the ability to then take other amplifying data about who owns the vessel and things that may be out there. When did they file their 96-hour Notice of Arrival? Who are the crew? Who are the owners? All that other information that really isn't related to the

sensor, not to the blip of AIS. It is related, really, to the bigger picture.

So the whole idea behind achieving actionable situational awareness is light up the things, get the watch-standers who are in there all day long, get them to light up and say, okay, here is something you need to look at. Then they use their talents to determine if this is something they need to explore further or not.

But by doing that, and getting rid of all those manual processes, you have a lot fewer things get missed, because they are spending their time, you know, doing the grunt work. What you really want is light it up, apply those business rules.

And if you think of it as a portfolio of rules, the old adage, when you have seen one port, you have seen one port. As you go to different AORs and different environments, 80 percent of it might be the same, or maybe 50 percent is the same. You have to have a way to be able to create rules for them, for those particular ports that may be different. You may not have a lot of drug trafficking that is going on in Seattle, where you have a lot going on in Miami.

It is those kind of nuances that you have to be able to give them the ability to do themselves. And without some sort of tool, you have to—you are not going to achieve it. So the whole idea behind Viz Tools is to prove some of those things, and figure out the best way to, A, create the rules, but also to visualize that information.

Whether it is Command Bridge or some other product really isn't the driver here. The driver is lessons learned, figuring out what works, what doesn't. And hopefully being able to apply the process going forward.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. SANCHEZ. You are welcome.

Captain Schultz, according to your written testimony, Sector Miami is responsible for all Coast Guard missions spanning 165 miles southeast of Florida coastline and encompassing numerous counties. And within that region, there are five ports collectively handling more than 9,000 annual vessel arrivals. And the region is also home to two of the three largest cruise ship ports in the world, with nearly 4,000,000 passengers moving through both Port Everglades and the Port of Miami annually.

So how many boats are currently assigned to Sector Miami?

Captain SCHULTZ. We have nine Coast Guard cutters assigned to Sector Miami, and then I have four multi-mission small boat stations, with various levels of small boats assigned.

Here in Miami Beach, I have—I think it is six hulls assigned to Miami Beach. I have actually seven in Miami, four up in Fort Lauderdale, I believe it is. Three in Lake Worth, three up in Fort Pierce. And we have some, you know, maintenance response hulls to support them when one goes out to service.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So how many of these boats are currently at sea?

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, on a typical day, Madam Chair, generally we have one to two, on occasion three, patrol boats that are actually pushing the border out of the ports, you know, patrolling in the Straits of Florida.

Closer to home, our small boat stations have resources on the water every day. They are not on the water 24 hours of every day, but they are on the water a certain portion of every day, doing var-

ious types of missions. They may be out doing a search and rescue case in the morning or the afternoon; they may be on a ports and waterway coastal security patrol, out looking at maritime critical infrastructure and key resources up the Miami River; they may be involved escorting a cruise ship out here in a patrol with model automatic weapons, doing what we call our ports, waterways and coastal security mission.

So there is a presence on the water from those stations just about every day of the year, absent, you know, a bad day or two where weather precludes that. But there is a presence. I can't give you a specific number, because it varies, depending on the time of the day and the day of the week.

Ms. SANCHEZ. How many people are currently assigned to Sector Miami?

Captain SCHULTZ. We have approximately 500 active duty Coast Guard men and women, about 150-plus Coast Guard Reservists, and then our auxiliary or volunteer ranks number somewhere between 1000 and 1100.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how many people and assets did Sector Miami contribute to the Coast Guard's efforts in Iraq?

Captain SCHULTZ. Technically, I don't have any assets that—that are contributing to Iraq. We had—there are two patrol boats, Coast Guard Cutter Baranof and Coast Guard Cutter Maui, that were home ported previously here in Miami.

I am not sure exactly how they are reported on—on our books regarding their operating facility codes and things, but they have been deployed for—deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for some time now.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Does the Coast Guard currently have the ability to track all of the vessels carrying illegal migrants and narcotics destined for south Florida?

Captain SCHULTZ. No.

Ms. SANCHEZ. What percentage of these vessels do you think are tracked?

Captain SCHULTZ. Well, there is a two-part answer, Madam Chair, to that question. I guess when it comes with Cuban migrants here in south Florida, the Cuban migrants that we interdict at sea, we obviously can contain that number, know that number. Cuban migrants that make landfall here in south Florida come forward and they start their clock once they are here in the States, and certain rights are afforded to them. They can apply for citizenship a year and a day later, I believe it is.

With migrants from other countries, generally, when they reach our shores, they tend to go underground. They don't self-declare, so we really don't know the denominator in that equation. I couldn't give you a number, because I don't know the answer to that number, outside of the Cuban migrants.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Colonel—

Colonel JANES. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. SANCHEZ. —you said in your testimony that port staff should receive daily intelligence updates from the Department of Homeland Security. Why?

Colonel JANES. If there were a threat of a security incident, I don't think it is fair to all of a sudden start sending them informa-

tion. I think if we have a system in place, that we share the information, our ports would get into a mode of routinely processing it, how they would handle it with their staff, and would probably talk through responses.

If they learned of a threat that would be presented to a port in Seattle, I think our port—our ports are security conscious, that they would, in many instances, sit down and discuss how they might respond.

I don't think that you can all of a sudden turn an intelligence-sharing process on and off. It ought to be on. The information they have a need to know, we should share with them so that they can develop their own internal apparatus on how to share it within the port and what they might do to respond.

To me, it is a start of best practices and lessons learned, if they are able to participate.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Does your have staff have the security clearances necessary to receive daily intelligence briefs? And what assistance has the Homeland Security Department given you in trying to attain those clearances?

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, I am in the process of getting my own clearance in place. So some of that, I could not truly answer. And each port would have to—

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how long have you been trying?

Colonel JANES. I am probably into two months now, to apply. And I have turned in the paperwork, fingerprinted, and whatever. And, again, I had a security clearance, Top Secret Cosmic Atomic, years ago. But when I left the Army, it expired, so I have to go through the process again. And I understand that.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how long do you anticipate, or have they told you that it would take, to get you cleared, if everything was according to as it should be?

Colonel JANES. I—I cannot answer that. I will tell you when I receive it, from the—the time when I applied, when I get it. But right now, I couldn't tell you.

Ms. SANCHEZ. In your testimony, you talked about regionalizing the government's national strategies. How would regionalization—can you sort of talk to that, and what you think that would look like? And I am interested in how it would improve the federal government's response to drug trafficking and terrorism down here in this sector.

Colonel JANES. Madam Chair, as indicated when you read my bio, I worked four years in the National Terrorism Preparedness Institute, and work with the Department of Homeland Security.

I am unaware of planning that—that goes down into a region or a state that would indicate how a drug threat assessment, which could be used to provide a terrorism weapon into our country, how those are discussed locally. I don't believe they are. And if they are, it is stovepipe within a particular law enforcement agency.

Prior to 9/11, we had a problem sharing national intelligence. I submitted in my testimony, I think we have a similar problem sharing law enforcement information today. DEA, our high intensity drug trafficking areas, they communicate and share information, but it is not unified into one plan.

Our three HIDTAs in Florida encompass 22 counties. We have 67 counties. Next year, with the help of our Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Florida National Guard, we will capture a drug threat assessment for the other 45 counties. That will give us a state-wide drug threat assessment.

A drug threat assessment could be used to parallel what could be a terrorism route through drug trafficking. And, likewise, our law enforcement, looking proactive, okay, what might we do about that.

The reason I said regional, if you look at the State of Florida, it is not just the land that we physically occupy. Our Coast Guard has a major role. DEA, ICE, the Immigrations, Customs Border Protection, all of these are important players.

I think a strategy that encompasses the Gulf Coast states that take I-10, where we know drugs are moving from Mexico and the western United States into Atlanta and right down into our state. The HIDTA that is located in Atlanta, I have talked to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, also with JIATF South, the Joint Interagency Task Force South, Admiral Nimick, we plan to meet with them in January and look at each other's different intelligence capabilities, merge those, I hope, and I believe, under our Florida Department of Law Enforcement leadership, into a unified law enforcement assessment of what the threat is. And then we can begin to operationalize what do we do about it.

Because right now, it is kind of piecemeal. It is reactive, rather than proactive. The drug trafficking organizations are international. If there is a problem in Palm Beach County, and law enforcement in Palm Beach County turns up the heat on the drug trafficking organization, they will come north into Tallahassee, into Leon County. And as I talk to sheriffs in both counties, they are aware of that.

There is not a unifying strategy in Florida to deal across the state. We are working on doing that. I believe Florida needs to be a part of a regional strategy. Likewise, the national response needs to be looked at regionally, nationally. And these resources, intelligence, and response, should be unified in a regional, national effort. And that is not done today.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My last question, and it is for all three of you, I have a Chief of Port Police in Los Angeles, Chief Cunningham. He has since left. But when I initially started several years ago on this Committee, he said there are three things you need to worry about at a port. One, what is in the box? What is in the container? Two, who is on the port? Who should be there and who shouldn't be there? And three, how are the different layers of government working together?

And I am very interested to hear from you how are the layers of government working together here in South Florida. And I ask that because, of course, we saw the problems we had in Katrina, with local and state and federal denying each other access, or not talking to each other. And we recently saw what could be the same problem in the oil spill response in the Bay area in California just two weeks ago.

So my question to you is: How do you all really get along? Are you talking to each other? Are you talking to all the different agen-

cies that are involved if something should happen here or if we should try to stop something that we know may happen? And what do we need to work on?

And maybe I will start down there and we will go down here.

Colonel JANES. I, of course, do not work on a port on a daily basis, but I visit our ports and listen to them in the Council. I—uniformly, I hear that the cooperation on the port is strong.

There is a resourcing issue; competition between security and commerce that gets to be a big issue.

To your chief who responded to you in California, Madam Chair, I would add that I do believe you need a plan, a unified plan. And that is the point that I have made to you, that I don't believe we have. The partners and the cooperation is there, and they share information, but I think that we are doing better. Our ports are doing quarterly threat assessments. They have a port security plan that addresses their port.

But it doesn't regionalize, and it looks only at the port. But the threat that impacts these points is air, land, and sea. And it goes back to the point that I think I have stressed. Cooperation is there, but I don't think we have fixed responsibility and have an adequate plan to address it.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

Mr. DRYDEN. I think I should defer to the operators in the local area on this one.

Captain SCHULTZ. Madam Chair, I think the answer to that is a very strong positive message here in South Florida. I am personally involved with the Port Directors, with their designated Assistant Port Directors for Security. We meet on an at least monthly basis at an executive level.

Here in the Port of Miami, up in Port Everglades, and Palm Beach, I have folks on my staff, port teams, as we call them, that come to work in the seaport. Here in the Port of Miami, which you visited this morning, there is a physical presence. They have office space there. They walk the docks. They are rubbing elbows with the Port Security Enforcement Specialists. They are there with the port staff. They are there with the Miami-Dade Police Department, who is actually a security provider under contract with the port.

At the State level, my regional counterpart, the Major here in this part of the country, you know, we talk probably a couple times a week. As I mentioned earlier, we will meet with the Regional Domestic Security Task Force tomorrow. I co-chair the Maritime Working Group there with my State partner from Fish and Wildlife Commission. And we—that will be all the law enforcement agencies down here, and first responders that have a maritime component to their mission. We will get together, and we talk. We share e-mails.

When there are new challenges, when the State in Florida Statute 311.11, 311.12 came out with some new requirements on quarterly threat assessments, this Maritime Working Group element of the RDSTF, the Regional Domestic Security Task Force, came up with a Seaport Security Assistance Team function to help, you know, work through those processes.

So I think we are very well connected in that regard. There is always room for improvement, but with—you link this back to the



cruise ships and the number of passengers here. There is more work than any one of our agencies can do alone. Miami is very much a maritime city. You mentioned meeting Admiral Stavridis recently, and he will talk about Miami, he will put the picture on the overhead and show you just how maritime it is, just from a visual standpoint.

We, day-to-day, we had the Super Bowl 2007 here; Super Bowl is back in 2010. We have had the Governors' Conference on Global Warming. We had the State Department/FBI Conference on Combating Global Terrorism with 23, 25 minister-level folks in from foreign countries.

We do water site security every day down here. And we don't just train, we actually live it. And it forces us to have mature relationships. So I would say a good part of my duties as Sector Commander, at my level, is working those relationships at my counterparts, you know, with them, and making sure my folks have that same level of connectivity.

And, again, it is commitment. If you backed out the number of folks I have on the Port Teams, that is probably close to 20 percent of my Sector staff. Not my outlying field units, but 15 to 20 percent of my staff is out, deployed in the seaports. They are working with Fran Bonesack from the Miami River. Her folks come in for a weekly meeting.

So, again, we can always do better, but we take that part very seriously down here. That is a part of the Domain Awareness that I think is probably something we can do and continue to build on.

Lastly on that, we are working very closely with Customs and Border Protection. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commissioner of CBP signed a memorandum, an MOU, back in 2006, looking at better cooperation. I have got—Monday morning, I had a CBP officer in my Command Center, briefing their activities in the port. My people are over there briefing the seaport, the CBP folks.

CBP is building a joint fusion center down here, and we have committed bodies to be in that, to further enhance that sharing of information, intelligence, cooperation, collaboration.

So I think there is a good new story there, and we are very focused on building on that good new story.

Ms. SANCHEZ. All right. Mr. Bilirakis, do you have any questions left?

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Just one last question.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. We will let you have the last question, then.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Colonel Janes, in your opinion, how do we stand on aligning the TWIC card, aligning it with Florida's Port Access Control Credential? And how important is this to the State of Florida? And what can we do as a Committee to make this happen?

Colonel JANES. We have made progress, Congressman, in the last month, but I am very concerned that we do not have positive steps from Transportation Security Administration to unify the two credential requirements before they begin to issue the TWIC in Florida.

I think the issue is of paramount importance. I cannot overstate it, because it affects every port worker, it doubles costs, it is huge morale issues.

Florida has been ready to issue a biometric credential since—since March of this year. We have actually delayed that in our efforts to align, because if we did not, it would double the cost, duplicate costs, cause inconvenience for everyone working on the port.

Only recently, with the help of former Deputy Secretary Jackson, was he able to facilitate a discussion with TSA that the National Criminal Investigative Check information could be shared from the federal to the state level.

Now, TSA still has concerns with how to make that happen. The privacy concerns, and my concern, is that they show up in January to begin to issue the TWIC, which meets the federal rule, but does not meet the Florida statute.

So the concerns are very great. And there is a solution at hand.

The way you could help is to ask TSA to align their schedule with the alignment of the credential. We do not need two credentials in Florida. We don't need to jeopardize commerce, force our businesses to go elsewhere, but just cause a break-down in bureaucracy between the federal and state level to align the systems.

And anything you can do to encourage TSA to make this happen, because they have now been given the wherewithal, I believe, with the intervention of the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. Thanks for that update. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for the panel testifying. Thank you, Madam Chair, for bringing this Committee to the State of Florida. Appreciate it.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank my colleague from Florida, and I thank the witnesses for your testimony, and my colleague for his questions.

And, as you know, we may ask you additional questions. We will do so in writing, and we expect that you will quickly get back to us on that.

And hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands adjourned.

Once again, thank you to the people of Florida, Miami in particular, all the different government agencies who hosted us so graciously today. Thank you.

Hearing no further business, this Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

